Poland in between worlds, continents and geological challenges. A Stratfor analysis worth to read.
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
NATO News: New Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
From September 2012, the new Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is the Air Force General Jean-Paul Paloméros. He will replace Air Force General Stéphane Abrial.
Paloméros is the 49th Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, position he took from Abrial. He participated at two international operations during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Operation Crécelle, aimed to restore democracy and Deny Flight, aimed to the enforcement of a UN no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Allied Commander Transformation are the only NATO Command in North America and the only permanent headquarters outside Europe. Situated in Norfolk, Virginia, its role is to lead the tranformation of NATO's military structure, aiming among other at enhancing the training and promoting new concepts for increasing the inter-operability between the member countries.
Thursday, December 30, 2010
Belarus, the rogue state
Image via Wikipedia//Lukashenko is looking EastBelarus – or White Russia – where it is on the map? What can you, my reader, tell me about this state? A couple of months ago, maybe the last year, I’ve read an interesting article in the Monocle review about the business environment and the expat life there. I doubt it was a promotional one, but anyway, it was interesting to discover that it is something going on in this corner of the world – is this part of Europe?, you might ask.
What I know for sure, without reading daily reports about Belarus is that there is a president called Aleksandr Lukashenko, a former director of a state-owned agricultural farm, who is in power since 1994. And who is organizing puppet elections for enjoying the wonderful pleasure of being reelected – with a vast majority, if possible, this time with a successful rate of almost 97%.
As in many puppet states, there are opposition parties whose candidates are allowed to compete, but if unhappy with the results, they are in danger to be put in prison and convicted for years in prison. And this is available for anybody daring to protest, as it happened on the streets of Minsk, December 19th: journalists, civic activists, or even foreign citizens of the former Empire.
The US and EU condemned the post-election crackdown and said the ballot itself had been flawed and international media extensively reported about the daily violences and the international reactions.
Is Russia – with whom Belarus had a long dispute in 2006 over the gas supplies in 2006 – a supporter of Lukashenko? This is hard to think that without Russia’s support, few of the countries with open communications channels with Minsk – Lukashenko will resist. Apparently, as in other situations, the discussions over gas is a completely separate business of the political dialogue. In comparison with other years, Moscow, and mainly prime-minister Vladimir Putin, is decided to avoid any new gas rows and by thus, giving a green light to Minsk to continue unhampered its repressive policies. A free Belarus will think about joining EU and NATO and will be a lost card from the poker full of the old Empire. A dangerous game for the future.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
What offer to the Middle East?
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) counting professionals with connections to the US military establishment published a couple of days ago a very interesting report regarding the possible and recommended security direction for a prospective Palestinian state.
Following the lessons learned from the analysis of three international peace missions - in East Timor, Kosovo and Lebanon - the authors are drafting the possibilities of creating a security environment in the Middle East, starting from the application of the two-state solution. An interesting proposal is to create a NATO-led military force, complemented by a civilian-led organism, able to handle political, governance and development matters.
NATO is assigned a big role in creating the premices for peace. but if at the military level this solution could be viable - given the long experience of the Alliance in dealing with difficult environments, from the political point of view, creating consensus for supporting a new mission - after the various discussions regarding the situation from Afghanistan would be more difficult.
US Middle East envoy George Mitchell is these days in the region with meeting scheduled with representatives of the the state of Israel and of the Palestinian authority. Since the beginning of this year, the political relations between Israel and US suffered several set-backs. In advance of the visit of the Washington representative, Israeli prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu reaffirmed the standpoints expressed in his June 2009: the state of Israel needs the necessary security guarantees in order to accept the creation of a Palestinian state.
The optimism regarding the area must continue to be extremely moderated. But, in the same time, thinking about solutions and possibilities of implementation could open a door to a new level of the discussions. Given the failures of the last decades, any optimism is counter-productive if not a dangerous illusion.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Ukraine, the riddle
Reading Russian politics is not easy. As it is not easy at all to understand its influences in the immediate neighbourhood as Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Central Asia or Belarus. A "yes" could be a "not" and a "not" could be a "yes". Or we are tempted to read it so, because of our inner naivity and lack of comprehension.
What do we need, in fact, to understand? As the institutions are strictly connected with individuals, we need to know "who's who" and all the Byzantine personal relations dominating the political, economic, social and cultural life. The genealogical approach is useful, as it is necessary to have permanently a direct contact with this world. Sympathies could turn into animosities and love into hate. Or, at least, for me is one of the most useful approach. But, as I rarely address such topics, I do not have any pretention at all to provide a clear perspective.
We will shortly stop now to Ukraine, where the new elected president, Viktor Yanukovych, announced no intention to join NATO. A pleasant news for the ears of Kremlin, that harshly opposed any close and direct relationship between the North-Atlantic Alliance and Kyiv. It was the same in the case of the Baltic states and these states are today members of both EU and NATO. It is worthy to mention that Ukraine is an active member of the dialogue with NATO. Yanukovych's declaration didn't addressed this activity or the eventuality of putting an end to this dialogue. The issue was whether or not to join the Alliance and he answered "no". Or, at least, "not now" - in the next four years of his presidential mandate.
We could question as well: is Ukraine prepared to enter NATO? Are the Ukrainian institutions ready enough to tackle to financial and administrative pressures involved by the full membership to this alliance? Are the Ukrainian military structures prepared to reform significantly in order to be trusted enough for sharing information with the North-Atlantic partners?
Yanukovych was considered one of the main looser after the 2004 "Orange Revolution". But, in reality, the term "revolution" was overrated and for six years already Ukraine fought a serious political instability and lack of reform. The expectations were too high and not took into consideration the Soviet heritage and the problematic structure of the country. It is Russia guilty for the general instability? Moscow is not innocent at all and continues to exert its influence through first and second and third range politicians or more or less public figures. But, it was like this in the Baltic states as well. Or continue to be. And there, the reforms were possible. Maybe the countries are smaller. But, with - most likely - or without Russia - almost impossible - the question is about having a serious track of reforms. A record not achieved during Yuschenko. Whould Yanukovych, whose slogan was "Stability and Order", change somehow this situation? He never made a secret of his support from the part of Moscow and probably he would not disappoint his friends. But, as the case of Belarus showed, when it is about business - gas business - money talks. And, given the large number of friends Russia is having in Ukraine, any choices could be make very easy. Voronin, in Moldova, never denied his Russian close ties. But, he is now recent past history.
Indicted several times for a robbery and moderate assault, or for "mild degree body injuries" in the 70s, autodidact, close friend of business community from Donetsk area - among which Rinat Akhmetov, in Top 50 European Forbes -, where he served twice as governor, former prime minister, Yanukovych is an interesting character in the strange riddle of Russian matrischkas game.
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Joe Biden in Central and Eastern Europe
He will visit Czech Republic, Poland and Romania at the end of October, shortly after the official announcement of renouncement of the implementation of the BMD project in this area.
Joe Biden in Central and Eastern Europe
at the end of October, shortly after the announcement of changing the BMD plans.
Saturday, September 5, 2009
Few in NATO Support Call For Additional Forces in Afghanistan
August 31
In an assessment of the war in Afghanistan by the commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal stated that a new strategy is needed to fight the Taliban. Although it was not addressed in the strategic review sent to both the Pentagon and NATO headquarters on Monday, it is widely anticipated that McChrystal will ask for more troops to deal with the situation in a separate request expected in a of couple weeks, a proposal that may face considerable opposition in many NATO countries.
While the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes survey of 25 nations found broad global support for President Barack Obama and his policy goals, the one notable exception was his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan. Significant opposition to troop increases was found in all NATO countries polled; at least half of those surveyed in Germany (63%), France (62%), Poland (57%), Canada (55%), Britain (51%) and Spain (50%) disapproved of sending more troops to Afghanistan.In addition to opposing new troop commitments, many in NATO countries want troops withdrawn altogether.
Read the full commentary at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1325/little-support-in-nato-for-afghanistan-troop-increases
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
The piracy business is expanding
In the case of the Artic Sea, the perpetrators are of Russian, Estonian and Latvian origin.
Still a question how the vessel dissapear for quite a long time.
And, from the beginning of the year, the list of victims is increasing. NATO launched this Monday an operation aiming to discourage piracy in the Horn of Africa area, continuation of the previous operation "Allied Protector", with the same aim.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Monday, August 3, 2009
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
The U.S.-Russian Summit Turns Routine
George Friedman
The Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has ended. As is almost always the case, the atmospherics were good, with the proper things said on all sides and statements and gestures of deep sincerity made. And as with all summits, those atmospherics are like the air: insubstantial and ultimately invisible. While there were indications of substantial movement, you would have needed a microscope to see them. An agreement was reached on what an agreement on nuclear arms reduction might look like, but we do not regard this as a strategic matter. The number of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles is a Cold War issue that concerned the security of each side’s nuclear deterrent. We do not mean to argue that removing a thousand or so nuclear weapons is unimportant, but instead that no one is deterring anyone these days, and the risk of accidental launch is as large or as small whether there are 500 or 5,000 launchers or warheads. Either way, nuclear arms’ strategic significance remains unchanged. The summit perhaps has created a process that could lead to some degree of confidence. It is not lack of confidence dividing the two countries, however, but rather divisions on fundamental geopolitical issues that don’t intersect with the missile question.
The Fundamental Issues
There are dozens of contentious issues between the United States and Russia, but in our mind three issues are fundamental. First, there is the question of whether Poland will become a base from which the United States can contain Russian power, or from the Russian point of view, threaten the former Soviet Union. The ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that the United States has slated for Poland does not directly affect that issue, though it symbolizes it. It represents the U.S. use of Polish territory for strategic purposes, and it is something the Russians oppose not so much for the system’s direct or specific threat — which is minimal — but for what it symbolizes about the Americans’ status in Poland. The Russians hoped to get Obama to follow the policy at the summit that he alluded to during his campaign for the U.S. presidency: namely, removing the BMD program from Poland to reduce tensions with Russia. Second, there is the question of Iran. This is a strategic matter for the United States, perhaps even more pressing since the recent Iranian election. The United States badly needs to isolate Iran effectively, something impossible without Russian cooperation. Moscow has refused to join Washington on this issue, in part because it is so important to the United States. Given its importance to the Americans, the Russians see Iran as a lever with which they can try to control U.S. actions elsewhere. The Americans do not want to see Russian support, and particularly arms sales, to Iran. Given that, the Russians don’t want to close off the possibility of supporting Iran. The United States wanted to see some Russian commitments on Iran at the summit. And third, there is the question of U.S. relations with former Soviet countries other than Russia, and the expressed U.S. desire to see NATO expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians insist that any such expansion threatens Russian national security and understandings with previous U.S. administrations. The United States insists that no such understandings exist, that NATO expansion doesn’t threaten Russia, and that the expansion will continue. The Russians were hoping the Americans would back off on this issue at the summit. Of some importance, but not as fundamental as the previous issues, was the question of whether Russia will allow U.S. arms shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory. This issue became important last winter when Taliban attacks on U.S. supply routes through Pakistan intensified, putting the viability of those routes in question. In recent months the Russians have accepted the transit of nonlethal materiel through Russia, but not arms. Even before the summit, the Russians made a concession on this point, giving the United States the right to transit military equipment via Russian airspace. This was a significant policy change designed to demonstrate Russia’s flexibility. At the same time, the step is not as significant as it appeared. The move cost the Russians little under the circumstances, and is easily revoked. And while the United States might use the route, the route is always subject to Russian pressure, meaning the United States is not going to allow a strategic dependence to develop. Moreover, the U.S. need is not as apparent now as it was a few months ago. And finally, a Talibanized Afghanistan is not in the Russian interest. That Russia did not grant the U.S. request last February merely reveals how bad U.S.-Russian relations were at the time. Conversely, the Russian concession on the issue signals that U.S.-Russian relations have improved. The concession was all the more significant in that it came after Obama praised Medvedev for his openness and criticized Putin as having one foot in the Cold War, clearly an attempt to play the two Russian leaders off each other.
What the Summit Produced
Much more significantly, the United States did not agree to withdraw the BMD system from Poland at the summit. Washington did not say that removal is impossible, but instead delayed that discussion until at least September, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Moscow. A joint review of all of the world’s missile capabilities was established at the summit, and this joint review will consider Iranian — and North Korean — missiles. The Polish BMD system will be addressed in that context. In other words, Washington did not concede on the point, but it did not close off discussions. The Russians accordingly did not get what they wanted on the missiles at the summit; they got even less of what they wanted in the broader strategic sense of a neutralized Poland. The Russians in turn made no visible concessions on Iran. Apart from studying the Iranians’ missile systems, the Russians made no pledge to join in sanctions on Iran, nor did they join in any criticism of the current crackdown in Iran. The United States had once offered to trade Polish BMDs for Russian cooperation on Iran, an idea rejected by the Russians since the BMD system in Poland wasn’t worth the leverage Moscow has with Iran. Certainly without the Polish BMD withdrawal, there was going to be no movement on Iran. NATO expansion is where some U.S. concession might have emerged. In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.” On the surface, this reiterated the old U.S. position, which was that NATO expansion was between NATO and individual nations of the former Soviet Union, and did not — and should not — concern Moscow. The terms of expanding, reforming and contributing to NATO remained the same. But immediately after the Obama-Putin meeting, Russian sources began claiming that an understanding on NATO expansion was reached, and that the Americans conceded the point. We see some evidence for this in the speech — the U.S. public position almost never has included mention of public support or reforms. In many ways, however, this is splitting hairs. The French and Germans have long insisted that any NATO expansion should be limited to countries with strong public support for expansion, and which meet certain military thresholds that Georgia and Ukraine clearly do not meet (and could not meet even with a decade of hard work). Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement. Therefore, we come away with the sense that the summit changed little, but that it certainly didn’t cause any deterioration, which could have happened. Having a summit that causes no damage is an achievement in itself.
The Kennedy Trap
Perhaps the most important part of the summit was that Obama does not seem to have fallen into the Kennedy trap. Part of the lack of serious resolutions at the summit undoubtedly resulted from Obama’s unwillingness to be excessively accommodating to the Russians. With all of the comparisons to the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit being bruited about, Obama clearly had at least one overriding goal in Moscow: to not be weak. Obama tried to show his skills even before the summit, playing Medvedev and Putin against each other. No matter how obvious and clumsy that might have been, it served a public purpose by making it clear that Obama was not in awe of either of them. Creating processes rather than solutions also was part of that strategy. It appears, however, that the Russians did fall into the Kennedy trap a bit. The eagerness of Putin’s advisers to tout U.S. concession on Ukraine and Georgia after their meeting in spite of scant public evidence of such concessions gives us the sense that Putin wanted to show that he achieved something Medvedev couldn’t. There may well be a growing rivalry between Medvedev and Putin, and Obama might well have played off it. But that is for the gossip columns. The important news from the summit was as follows: First, no one screwed up, and second, U.S.-Russian relations did not get worse — and might actually have improved. No far-reaching strategic agreements were attained, but strategic improvements in the future were not excluded. Obama played his role without faltering, and there may be some smidgen of tension between the two personalities running Russia. As far as summits go, we have seen far worse and much better. But given the vitriol of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, routine is hardly a negative outcome. In the meantime, BMD remains under development in Poland, there is no U.S.-Russian agreement on Iran and, as far as we can confirm at present, no major shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine and Georgia has occurred. This summit will not be long remembered, but then Obama did not want the word “disastrous” attached to this summit as it had been to Kennedy’s first Soviet summit. We wish there were more exciting things to report about the summit, but sometimes there simply aren’t. And sometimes the routine might turn out significant, but we doubt that in this case. The geopolitical divide between the United States and Russia is as deep as ever, even if some of the sharper edges have been rounded. Ultimately, little progress was made in finding ways to bridge the two countries’ divergent interests. And the burning issues — particularly Poland and Iran — continue to burn.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
NATO holds Georgia war games, Russia critical
NATO launched military exercises in former Soviet Georgia on Wednesday after heavy criticism from neighboring Russia and a brief mutiny in the Georgian military.
Russia — which regards NATO as a Cold War relic with intrusive ambitions to expand into former Soviet countries — angrily dismissed as a "provocation" Georgian accusations that Tuesday's mutiny was a coup attempt engineered in Moscow.
Adding to tensions, Russia on Wednesday expelled two Canadian diplomats who worked at NATO offices in Moscow. The Foreign Ministry said the NATO employees' expulsion was meant as retaliation for the alliance's decision to kick out two Russian envoys from of its headquarters in Brussels, apparently over a February spy scandal.
"We, naturally, were forced to react," Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in televised comments Wednesday, adding the reciprocal measure was simply playing by the "rules of the game."
Georgia has stepped back from its initial allegations that Tuesday's mutiny was orchestrated by Moscow to topple Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, and now say it was aimed at disrupting the NATO exercises.
Hundreds of Georgian soldiers surrendered late Tuesday after a daylong standoff at the Mukhrovani tank battalion headquarters near the capital, Tbilisi, during which they had barred the defense minister from entering and declared they would refused to follow orders.
Some Georgian opposition members called the mutiny a charade, cooked up by Saakashvili to rally disgruntled Georgians around the beleaguered president. Opposition supporters have protested for weeks in the capital, accusing the president of corruption, mismanagement and provoking Georgia's August war with Russia.
Russian-Georgian relations have been tense since the pro-Western Saakashvili came to power amid a popular revolution in 2003, and worsened after the war and Russia's recognition of two breakaway Georgian regions.
Russia is also annoyed at Georgia courting closer ties with NATO, the United States and the European Union, and is especially riled by the NATO military exercises under way at a military base near Tbilisi — not far from the base at which Tuesday's revolt occurred.
Russian officials view the war games as a typical manifestation of Western meddling, and have accused the alliance of intervening in Georgia's domestic politics by holding the exercises.
Georgian Defense Ministry spokesman David Dzhokhadze told The Associated Press that no battlefield maneuvers were planned until at least May 11, and meetings would dominate proceedings until then.
Georgia expects 15 countries to take part in the NATO exercises, Dzhokhadze said, Switzerland, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia said they would not take part. Armenia has also said it would bow out, but Dzhokhadze said Georgia has yet to be notified.
Associated Press writer David Nowak contributed to this report from Moscow.
Monday, April 27, 2009
Obama's First Hundred Days and U.S. Presidential Realities
U.S. presidential candidates run for office as if they would be free to act however they wish once elected. But upon election, they govern as they must. The freedom of the campaign trail contrasts sharply with the constraints of reality.
The test of a president is how effectively he bridges the gap between what he said he would do and what he finds he must do. Great presidents achieve this seamlessly, while mediocre presidents never recover from the transition. All presidents make the shift, including Obama, who spent his first hundred days on this task.
Obama won the presidency with a much smaller margin than his supporters seem to believe. Despite his wide margin in the Electoral College, more than 47 percent of voters cast ballots against him. Obama was acutely aware of this and focused on making certain not to create a massive split in the country from the outset of his term. He did this in foreign policy by keeping Robert Gates on as defense secretary, bringing in Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and George Mitchell in key roles and essentially extrapolating from the Bush foreign policy. So far, this has worked. Obama’s approval rating rests at 69 percent, which The Washington Post notes is average for presidents at the hundred-day mark.
Obama, of course, came into office in circumstances he did not anticipate when he began campaigning — namely, the financial and economic crisis that really began to bite in September 2008. Obama had no problem bridging the gap between campaign and governance with regard to this matter, as his campaign neither anticipated nor proposed strategies for the crisis — it just hit. The general pattern for dealing with the crisis was set during the Bush administration, when the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board put in place a strategy of infusing money into failing institutions to prevent what they feared would be a calamitous economic chain reaction.
Obama continued the Bush policy, though he added a stimulus package. But such a package had been discussed in the Bush administration, and it is unlikely that Sen. John McCain would have avoided creating one had he been elected. Obviously, the particular projects funded and the particular interests favored would differ between McCain and Obama, but the essential principle would not. The financial crisis would have been handled the same way — just as everything from the Third World debt crisis to the Savings and Loan crisis would have been handled the same way no matter who was president. Under either man, the vast net worth of the United States (we estimate it at about $350 trillion) would have been tapped by printing money and raising taxes, and U.S. assets would have been used to underwrite bad investments, increase consumption and build political coalitions through pork. Obama had no plan for this. Instead, he expanded upon the Bush administration solution and followed tradition.
The Reality of International Affairs
The manner in which Obama was trapped by reality is most clear with regard to international affairs. At the heart of Obama’s campaign was the idea that one of the major failures of the Bush administration was alienating the European allies of the United States. Obama argued that a more forthcoming approach to the Europeans would yield a more forthcoming response. In fact, the Europeans were no more forthcoming with Obama than they were with Bush.
Obama’s latest trip to Europe focused on two American demands and one European — primarily German — demand. Obama wanted the Germans to increase their economic stimulus plan because Germany is the largest exporter in the world. With the United States stimulating its economy, the Germans could solve their economic problem simply by increasing exports into the United States. This would limit job creation in the United States, particularly because German exports involve automobiles as well as other things, and Obama has struggled to build domestic demand for U.S. autos. Thus, he wanted the Germans to build domestic demand and not just rely on the United States to pull Germany out of recession. But the Germans refused, arguing that they could not afford a major stimulus now (when in fact they have no reason to be flexible, because the U.S. stimulus is going to help them no matter what Germany does).
Germany’s and France’s unwillingness to provide substantially more support in Afghanistan gave Obama a second disappointment. Some European troops were sent, but their numbers were few and their mission was limited to a very short period. (In some cases, the European force contribution will focus on training indigenous police officers, which will take a year or more to really have an impact.) The French and Germans essentially were as unwilling to deal with Obama as they were with Bush on this matter.
The Europeans, on the other hand, wanted a major effort by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Central European banking system, largely owned by banks from more established European countries, has reached a crisis state because of aggressive lending policies. The Germans in particular don’t want to bail out these banks; they want the IMF to do so. Put differently, they want the United States, China and Japan to help underwrite the European banking system. Obama did agree to contribute to this effort, but not nearly on the scale the Europeans wanted.
On the whole, the Europeans gave two big nos, while the Americans gave a mild yes. In substantive terms, the U.S.-European relationship is no better than it was under Bush. In terms of perception, however, the Obama administration managed a brilliant coup, shifting the focus to the changed atmosphere that prevailed at the meeting. Indeed, all parties wanted to emphasize the atmospherics, and judging from media coverage, they succeeded. The trip accordingly was perceived as a triumph.
Campaign Promises and Public Perception
This is not a trivial achievement. There are campaign promises, there is reality and there is public perception. All presidents must move from campaigning to governing; extremely skilled presidents manage the shift without appearing duplicitous. At least in the European case, Obama has managed the shift without suffering political damage. His core supporters appear prepared to support him independent of results. And that is an important foundation for effective governance.
We can see the same continuity in his treatment of Russia. When he ran for president, Obama pledged to abandon the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment in Poland amid a great show made about resetting U.S. Russia policy. On taking office, however, he encountered the reality of the Russian position, which is that Russia wants to be the pre-eminent power in the former Soviet Union. The Bush administration took the position that the United States must be free to maintain bilateral relations with any country, to include the ability to extend NATO membership to interested countries. Obama has reaffirmed this core U.S. position.
The United States has asked for Russian help in two areas. First, Washington asked for a second supply line into Afghanistan. Moscow agreed so long as no military equipment was shipped in. Second, Washington offered to withdraw its BMD system from Poland in return for help from Moscow in blocking Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. The Russians refused, understanding that the offer on BMD was not worth removing a massive thorn (i.e., Iran) from the Americans’ side.
In other words, U.S.-Russian relations are about where they were in the Bush administration, and Obama’s substantive position is not materially different from the Bush administration’s position. The BMD deal remains in place, the United States is not depending on Russian help on logistics in Afghanistan, and Washington has not backed off on the principle of NATO expansion (even if expansion is most unlikely).
In Iraq, Obama has essentially followed the reality created under the Bush administration, shifting withdrawal dates somewhat but following the Petraeus strategy there and extending it — or trying to extend it — to Afghanistan. The Pakistani problem, of course, presents the greatest challenge (as it would have for any president), and Obama is coping with it to the extent possible.
Obama’s managing of perceptions as opposed to actually making policy changes shows up most clearly in regard to Iran. Obama tried to open the door to Tehran by indicating that he was prepared to talk to the Iranians without preconditions — that is, without any prior commitment on the part of the Iranians regarding nuclear development. The Iranians reacted by rejecting the opening, essentially saying Obama’s overture was merely a gesture, not a substantial shift in American policy. The Iranians are, of course, quite correct in this. Obama fully understands that he cannot shift policy on Iran without a host of regional complications. For example, the Saudis would be enormously upset by such an opening, while the Syrians would have to re-evaluate their entire position on openings to Israel and the United States. Changing U.S. Iranian policy is hard to do. There is a reason Washington has the policy it does, and that reason extends beyond presidents and policymakers.
When we look at Obama’s substantive foreign policy, we see continuity rather than changes. Certainly, the rhetoric has changed, and that is not insignificant; atmospherics do play a role in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, when we look across the globe, we see the same configuration of relationships, the same partners, the same enemies and the same ambiguity that dominates most global relations.
Turkey and the Substantial U.S. Shift
One substantial shift has taken place, however, and that one is with Turkey. The Obama administration has made major overtures to Turkey in multiple forms, from a presidential visit to putting U.S. anti-piracy vessels under Turkish command. These are not symbolic moves. The United States needs Turkey to counterbalance Iran, protect U.S. interests in the Caucasus, help stabilize Iraq, serve as a bridge to Syria and help in Afghanistan. Obama has clearly shifted strategy here in response to changing conditions in the region.
Intriguingly, the change in U.S.-Turkish relations never surfaced as even a minor issue during the U.S. presidential campaign. It emerged after the election because of changes in the configuration of the international system. Shifts in Russian policy, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and shifts within Turkey that allowed the country to begin its return to the international arena all came together to make this necessary, and Obama responded.
None of this is designed to denigrate Obama in the least. While many of his followers may be dismayed, and while many of his critics might be unwilling to notice, the fact is that a single concept dominated Obama’s first hundred days: continuity. In the face of the realities of his domestic political position and the U.S. strategic position, as well as the economic crisis, Obama did what he had to do, and what he had to do very much followed from what Bush did. It is fascinating that both Obama’s supporters and his critics think he has made far more changes than he really has.
Of course, this is only the first hundred days. Presidents look for room to maneuver after they do what they need to do in the short run. Some presidents use that room to pursue policies that weaken, and even destroy, their presidencies. Others find ways to enhance their position. But normally, the hardest thing a president faces is finding the space to do the things he wants to do rather than what he must do. Obama came through the first hundred days following the path laid out for him. It is only in Turkey where he made a move that he wasn’t compelled to make just now, but that had to happen at some point. It will be interesting to see how many more such moves he makes.
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Obama's Strategy and the Summits
The weeklong extravaganza of G-20, NATO, EU, U.S. and Turkey meetings has almost ended. The spin emerging from the meetings, echoed in most of the media, sought to portray the meetings as a success and as reflecting a re-emergence of trans-Atlantic unity.
The reality, however, is that the meetings ended in apparent unity because the United States accepted European unwillingness to compromise on key issues. U.S. President Barack Obama wanted the week to appear successful, and therefore backed off on key issues; the Europeans did the same. Moreover, Obama appears to have set a process in motion that bypasses Europe to focus on his last stop: Turkey.
Berlin, Washington and the G-20
Let’s begin with the G-20 meeting, which focused on the global financial crisis. As we said last year, there were many European positions, but the United States was reacting to Germany’s. Not only is Germany the largest economy in Europe, it is the largest exporter in the world. Any agreement that did not include Germany would be useless, whereas an agreement excluding the rest of Europe but including Germany would still be useful.
Two fundamental issues divided the United States and Germany. The first was whether Germany would match or come close to the U.S. stimulus package. The United States wanted Germany to stimulate its own domestic demand. Obama feared that if the United States put a stimulus plan into place, Germany would use increased demand in the U.S. market to expand its exports. The United States would wind up with massive deficits while the Germans took advantage of U.S. spending, thus letting Berlin enjoy the best of both worlds. Washington felt it had to stimulate its economy, and that this would inevitably benefit the rest of the world. But Washington wanted burden sharing. Berlin, quite rationally, did not. Even before the meetings, the United States dropped the demand — Germany was not going to cooperate.
The second issue was the financing of the bailout of the Central European banking system, heavily controlled by eurozone banks and part of the EU financial system. The Germans did not want an EU effort to bail out the banks. They wanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to bail out a substantial part of the EU financial system instead. The reason was simple: The IMF receives loans from the United States, as well as China and Japan, meaning the Europeans would be joined by others in underwriting the bailout. The United States has signaled it would be willing to contribute $100 billion to the IMF, of which a substantial portion would go to Central Europe. (Of the current loans given by the IMF, roughly 80 percent have gone to the struggling economies in Central Europe.) The United States therefore essentially has agreed to the German position.
Later at the NATO meeting, the Europeans — including Germany — declined to send substantial forces to Afghanistan. Instead, they designated a token force of 5,000, most of whom are scheduled to be in Afghanistan only until the August elections there, and few of whom actually would be engaged in combat operations. This is far below what Obama had been hoping for when he began his presidency.
Agreement was reached on collaboration in detecting international tax fraud and on further collaboration in managing the international crisis, however. But what that means remains extremely vague — as it was meant to be, since there was no consensus on what was to be done. In fact, the actual guidelines will still have to be hashed out at the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting in Scotland in November. Intriguingly, after insisting on the creation of a global regulatory regime — and with the vague U.S. assent — the European Union failed to agree on European regulations. In a meeting in Prague on April 4, the United Kingdom rejected the regulatory regime being proposed by Germany and France, saying it would leave the British banking system at a disadvantage.
Overall, the G-20 and the NATO meetings did not produce significant breakthroughs. Rather than pushing hard on issues or trading concessions — such as accepting Germany’s unwillingness to increase its stimulus package in return for more troops in Afghanistan — the United States failed to press or bargain. It preferred to appear as part of a consensus rather than appear isolated. The United States systematically avoided any appearance of disagreement.
The reason there was no bargaining was fairly simple: The Germans were not prepared to bargain. They came to the meetings with prepared positions, and the United States had no levers with which to move them. The only option was to withhold funding for the IMF, and that would have been a political disaster (not to mention economically rather unwise). The United States would have been seen as unwilling to participate in multilateral solutions rather than Germany being seen as trying to foist its economic problems on others. Obama has positioned himself as a multilateralist and can’t afford the political consequences of deviating from this perception. Contributing to the IMF, in these days of trillion-dollar bailouts, was the lower-cost alternative. Thus, the Germans have the U.S. boxed in.
The political aspect of this should not be underestimated. George W. Bush had extremely bad relations with the Europeans (in large part because he was prepared to confront them). This was Obama’s first major international foray, and he could not let it end in acrimony or wind up being seen as unable to move the Europeans after running a campaign based on his ability to manage the Western coalition. It was important that he come home having reached consensus with the Europeans. Backing off on key economic and military demands gave him that “consensus.”
Turkey and Obama’s Deeper Game
But it was not simply a matter of domestic politics. It is becoming clear that Obama is playing a deeper game. A couple of weeks before the meetings, when it had become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the issues that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled a trip to Turkey. During the EU meetings in Prague, Obama vigorously supported the Turkish application for EU membership, which several members are blocking on grounds of concerns over human rights and the role of the military in Turkey. But the real reason is that full membership would open European borders to Turkish migration, and the Europeans do not want free Turkish migration. The United States directly confronted the Europeans on this matter.
During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed his candidacy because of his defense on grounds of free speech of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on consensus, so any one member can block just about anything. The Turks backed off the veto, but won two key positions in NATO, including that of deputy secretary-general.
So while the Germans won their way at the meetings, it was the Turks who came back with the most. Not only did they boost their standing in NATO, they got Obama to come to a vigorous defense of the Turkish application for membership in the European Union, which of course the United States does not belong to. Obama then flew to Turkey for meetings and to attend a key international meeting that will allow him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.
The Russian Dimension
Let’s diverge to another dimension of these talks, which still concerns Turkey, but also concerns the Russians. While atmospherics after the last week’s meetings might have improved, there was certainly no fundamental shift in U.S.-Russian relations. The Russians have rejected the idea of pressuring Iran over its nuclear program in return for the United States abandoning its planned ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States simultaneously downplayed the importance of a Russian route to Afghanistan. Washington said there were sufficient supplies in Afghanistan and enough security on the Pakistani route such that the Russians weren’t essential for supplying Western operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States reached an agreement with Ukraine for the transshipment of supplies — a mostly symbolic gesture, but one guaranteed to infuriate the Russians at both the United States and Ukraine. Moreover, the NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO, although the German position on unspecified delays to such membership was there as well. When Obama looks at the chessboard, the key emerging challenge remains Russia.
The Germans are not going to be joining the United States in blocking Russia. Between dependence on Russia for energy supplies and little appetite for confronting a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany, the Germans are not going to address the Russian question. At the same time, the United States does not want to push the Germans toward Russia, particularly in confrontations ultimately of secondary importance and on which Germany has no give anyway. Obama is aware that the German left is viscerally anti-American, while Merkel is only pragmatically anti-American — a small distinction, but significant enough for Washington not to press Berlin.
At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia looks to be on the horizon. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have denied. The U.S. Congress for several years has threatened to pass a resolution condemning Turkish genocide against Armenians. The Turks are extraordinarily sensitive to this charge, and passage would have meant a break with the United States. Last week, they publicly began to discuss an agreement with the Armenians, including diplomatic recognition, which essentially disarms the danger from any U.S. resolution on genocide. Although an actual agreement hasn’t been signed just yet, anticipation is building on all sides.
The Turkish opening to Armenia has potentially significant implications for the balance of power in the Caucasus. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war created an unstable situation in an area of vital importance to Russia. Russian troops remain deployed, and NATO has called for their withdrawal from the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There are Russian troops in Armenia, meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded. In addition, there is talk of an alternative natural gas pipeline network from Azerbaijan to Europe.
Turkey is the key to all of this. If Ankara collaborates with Russia, Georgia’s position is precarious and Azerbaijan’s route to Europe is blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and also manages to reach a stable treaty with Armenia under U.S. auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.
From the American point of view, Europe is a lost cause since internally it cannot find a common position and its heavyweights are bound by their relationship with Russia. It cannot agree on economic policy, nor do its economic interests coincide with those of the United States, at least insofar as Germany is concerned. As far as Russia is concerned, Germany and Europe are locked in by their dependence on Russian natural gas. The U.S.-European relationship thus is torn apart not by personalities, but by fundamental economic and military realities. No amount of talking will solve that problem.
The key to sustaining the U.S.-German alliance is reducing Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas and putting Russia on the defensive rather than the offensive. The key to that now is Turkey, since it is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to get to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey — which has deep influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans — is prepared to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and a long-term solution to Germany’s energy problem can be found. On the other hand, if Turkey decides to take a defensive position and moves to cooperate with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is locked into Russian-controlled energy for a generation.
Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia’s junior partner.
This is why Obama’s most important speech in Europe was his last one, following Turkey’s emergence as a major player in NATO’s political structure. In that speech, he sided with the Turks against Europe, and extracted some minor concessions from the Europeans on the process for considering Turkey’s accession to the European Union. Why Turkey wants to be an EU member is not always obvious to us, but they do want membership. Obama is trying to show the Turks that he can deliver for them. He reiterated — if not laid it on even more heavily — all of this in his speech in Ankara. Obama laid out the U.S. position as one that recognized the tough geopolitical position Turkey is in and the leader that Turkey is becoming, and also recognized the commonalities between Washington and Ankara. This was exactly what Turkey wanted to hear.
The Caucasus is far from the only area to discuss. Talks will be held about blocking Iran in Iraq, U.S. relations with Syria and Syrian talks with Israel, and Central Asia, where both countries have interests. But the most important message to the Europeans will be that Europe is where you go for photo opportunities, but Turkey is where you go to do the business of geopolitics. It is unlikely that the Germans and French will get it. Their sense of what is happening in the world is utterly Eurocentric. But the Central Europeans, on the frontier with Russia and feeling quite put out by the German position on their banks, certainly do get it.
Obama gave the Europeans a pass for political reasons, and because arguing with the Europeans simply won’t yield benefits. But the key to the trip is what he gets out of Turkey — and whether in his speech to the civilizations, he can draw some of the venom out of the Islamic world by showing alignment with the largest economy among Muslim states, Turkey.
Saturday, April 4, 2009
Friday, April 3, 2009
NATO Summit: The news
NY Times - NATO debates the Afghan strains
Bloomberg - Strasbourg, the fortress city
Euronews - The battle with cyber attacks
TIME - A cloudy future?
Bloomberg - Strasbourg, the fortress city
Euronews - The battle with cyber attacks
TIME - A cloudy future?
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Image fears complicate NATO quest for new chief
NATO wants to name a new secretary-general at a summit starting on Friday, but concerns over its image in the Muslim world and elsewhere are hampering the quest for the right candidate.
Front-runner is Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, but Turkey is unhappy with his handling of a 2006 row over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad and other allies privately wonder how his appointment would go down in the Muslim world.
Another contender is Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. But Western European allies insist an official from a former Warsaw Pact country is not best placed to heal tensions between NATO and former Cold War foe Russia.
"There is no decision for now. I believe there is a 50-50 chance a new Sec-Gen will be elected," said a NATO envoy before the meeting hosted by France and Germany in the Rhineland.
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer can stay on until July 31 in his current mandate and several nations are stressing the decision on naming a successor can be delayed.
But the dilemma highlights the political sensitivity of any choice for the job, whose main task is to cajole member nations into consensus on tricky issues and keep them united.
The hesitations over Rasmussen are particularly acute given NATO's effort to convince ordinary Muslims in Afghanistan to back its war against Taliban insurgents.
"NATO as a whole should think about their image in the Muslim world," a senior Turkish diplomat, who declined to be named, told Reuters.
That worry has spread to others in the alliance, despite the fact that diplomats say Rasmussen has the United States and large European members supporting him.
Muslim protests fear
"There are concerns in NATO that as secretary-general Rasmussen would face fierce protests when he visited Muslim countries," said one alliance diplomat who also declined to be identified because of the sensitivities of discussions.
Rasmussen refused to apologise for the Prophet Mohammad caricatures, citing principles of freedom of expression held dear in Europe.
To Turkey's dismay, Denmark has also allowed a pro-Kurdish militant television station to broadcast from its soil.
Ankara has not so far threatened to block his appointment and has not pressed demands in other areas in return for its acceptance of Rasmussen.
But diplomats point to Turkey's frustration that a long territorial dispute with European Union-member Cyprus means it is excluded from the defence structures of the 27-nation bloc, most of whose members are also NATO states.
Turkey could simply be signalling its desire to be taken seriously within NATO and the wider world as it seeks a more active role helping resolve regional conflicts, others suggest.
While Sikorski has the support of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, his chances are seen as slim.
While he went as far this week as suggesting that Russia could one day be a NATO member, his country's awkward ties with Moscow and its willingness to host a U.S. missile shield system are seen as deal-breakers.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere is seen as a compromise choice but is handicapped as Norway is not a member of the EU.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Red Alert: Redefining the Global System
Stratfor
April 1
From Europe to Turkey, world leaders are coming together this week for a slew of global summits. There is much for these world leaders to discuss: the global financial infrastructure is now up for debate, the jihadist war continues to rage in South Asia, the Russians are locked into intractable negotiations with the Americans over the boundaries of the former Soviet sphere of influence, and the Turks are returning to their great power past.
These summits are not just about photo-ops and handshakes. Taken together, this array of diplomatic meetings constitute the greatest density of decision points in the modern world since the summits that brought about the end of the Cold War. This is a time when the true colors of nation-states come out, as each fights for their political, economic and security interests behind a thin veneer of global cooperation.
With geopolitical boundaries being redrawn across the world, STRATFOR has a responsibility to penetrate the media glitz and read through the lines of diluted joint statements and press conferences to explain to our readers the core issues at stake for each player involved. Through our extensive coverage in this week’s Global Summit series, our intent has been to do just that.
Midway through the bilateral summits, we have yet to see any major surprises deviating from our assessments. In the lead-up to the G-20 summit in London, the Americans and the Germans will be at the core of the debate over how to restructure the global financial system. The Americans, the British and the Japanese believe stimulus is the way to go to put the global economy back on track, while Germany, the economic heavyweight of Europe, prefers instead to export its way out of the recession. This is not a debate that will be resolved by the end of this summit (if at all), leaving G-20 members and the struggling economies watching from the outside with the impression that they have little choice but to fend for themselves in this severe economic environment.
The Americans do not just disagree with the Europeans on economics — in spite of Europe’s enthusiasm for U.S. President Barack Obama, the EU members at the summit made clear their unwillingness to make any meaningful contributions to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan beyond a few aid packages. With the Western coalition in Afghanistan looking more and more like a one-man show, the Americans are branching out of their post-World War II system of alliance in search of new strategic partners. The United States has found one such partner in Turkey, where Obama will be wrapping up his visit on April 6-7. This will demonstrate to allies and adversaries alike that Washington embraces a greater Turkish role in global affairs that stretch from the Islamic World to the Russian periphery.
The summits thus far have given the Russians plenty to chew on. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev came to the G-20 ready to negotiate with Obama on a slew of issues that revolve around a core Russian imperative of consolidating power in the former Soviet periphery. A look at the joint statement and press conferences from the Obama-Medvedev meetings might leave one with the impression that the Americans and the Russians are ready to cooperate, but in reality, all they could really boast about was a commitment to restart talks on nuclear disarmament, leaving a host of outstanding critical issues in limbo. It is quite apparent that the United States has its hands full, but Obama still let the Russians know that he does not intend sit back and allow Moscow to have its way with Eurasia. The Russians now have a better idea of Obama’s boundaries in these negotiations, but their priorities have not changed; Moscow still has ways of grabbing Washington’s attention.
It has been a roller coaster ride thus far, with still more to come. Before Obama makes his way to Turkey, he still has to touch base with his NATO allies in Prague. With the Russians ready to play hardball and the balance of the Eurasian landmass still in flux, these meetings will be anything but bland. Meanwhile, STRATFOR’s team of expert analysts will be working to provide their members with the analytical context to find significant meaning from these summits. A redefinition of global systems is taking place that will carry well into the future, and STRATFOR is here to provide the historical and analytical record.
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