Georgian-Russian crossing point reopened

The crossing point Verkhny/Upper Larsbetween Russia and Georgia, closed since July 2006, was reopened March 1. The decision was took at the end of the last year, following a request from Armenia and negotiated by Swiss diplomats. Verkhny Lars is the only crossing not going through the Russian-backed breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and maintains the only direct route from Russia to Armenia.

After the August 2008 war, the situation between Russia and Georgia remains tensed, and the bilateral relations frozen.

Twenty Years After the Fall

George Friedman

Stratfor
November 9


We are now at the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. We are also nearing the 18th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union itself. This is more than simply a moment for reflection — it is a moment to consider the current state of the region and of Russia versus that whose passing we are now commemorating. To do that, we must re-examine why the Soviet empire collapsed, and the current status of the same forces that caused that collapse.

Russia’s Two-Part Foundation

The Russian empire — both the Czarist and Communist versions — was a vast, multinational entity. At its greatest extent, it stretched into the heart of Central Europe; at other times, it was smaller. But it was always an empire whose constituent parts were diverse, hostile to each other and restless. Two things tied the empire together.
One was economic backwardness. Economic backwardness gave the constituent parts a single common characteristic and interest. None of them could effectively compete with the more dynamic economies of Western Europe and the rest of the world, but each could find a niche within the empire. Economic interests thus bound each part to the rest: They needed a wall to protect themselves from Western interests, and an arena in which their own economic interests, however stunted, could be protected. The empire provided that space and that opportunity.
The second thing tying the empire together was the power of the security apparatus. Where economic interest was insufficient to hold the constituent parts together, the apparatus held the structure together. In a vast empire with poor transportation and communication, the security apparatus — from Czarist times to the Soviet period — was the single unifying institution. It unified in the sense that it could compel what economic interest couldn’t motivate. The most sophisticated part of the Russian state was the security services. They were provided with the resources they needed to control the empire, report status to the center and impose the center’s decisions through terror, or more frequently, through the mere knowledge that terror would be the consequence of disobedience.
It was therefore no surprise that it was the security apparatus of the Soviet Union — the KGB under Yuri Andropov — which first recognized in the early 1980s that the Soviet Union’s economy not only was slipping further and further behind the West, but that its internal cohesion was threatened because the economy was performing so poorly that the minimal needs of the constituent parts were no longer being fulfilled. In Andropov’s mind, the imposition of even greater terror, like Josef Stalin had applied, would not solve the underlying problem. Thus, the two elements holding the Soviet Union together were no longer working. The self-enclosed economy was failing and the security apparatus could not hold the system together.
It is vital to remember that in Russia, domestic economic health and national power do not go hand in hand. Russia historically has had a dysfunctional economy. By contrast, its military power has always been disproportionately strong. During World War II, the Soviets crushed the Wehrmacht in spite of their extraordinary economic weakness. Later, during the Cold War, they challenged and sometimes even beat the United States despite an incomparably weaker economy. The Russian security apparatus made this possible. Russia could devote far more of its economy to military power than other countries could because Moscow could control its population successfully. It could impose far greater austerities than other countries could. Therefore, Russia was a major power in spite of its economic weakness. And this gave it room to maneuver in an unexpected way.

Andropov’s Gamble

Andropov proposed a strategy he knew was risky, but which he saw as unavoidable. One element involved a dramatic restructuring of the Soviet economy and society to enhance efficiency. The second involved increased openness, not just domestically to facilitate innovation, but also in foreign affairs. Enclosure was no longer working: The Soviet Union needed foreign capital and investment to make restructuring work.
Andropov knew that the West, and particularly the United States, would not provide help so long as the Soviet Union threatened its geopolitical interests even if doing so would be economically profitable. For this opening to the West to work, the Soviet Union needed to reduce Cold War tensions dramatically. In effect, the Soviets needed to trade geopolitical interests to secure their economic interests. Since securing economic interests was essential for Communist Party survival, Andropov was proposing to follow the lead of Vladimir Lenin, another leader who sacrificed space for time. In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that ended Russian participation in World War I, Lenin had conceded vast amounts of territory to Germany to buy time for the regime to consolidate itself. Andropov was suggesting the same thing.
It is essential to understand that Andropov was a Party man and a Chekist — a Communist and KGBer — through and through. He was not proposing the dismantling of the Party; rather, he sought to preserve the Party by executing a strategic retreat on the geopolitical front while the Soviet Union regained its economic balance. Undoubtedly he understood the risk that restructuring and openness would create enormous pressures at a time of economic hardship, possibly causing regime collapse under the strain. Andropov clearly thought the risk was worth running.
After Leonid Brezhnev died, Andropov took his place. He became ill almost immediately and died. He was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko, who died within a year. Then came Mikhail Gorbachev — the true heir to Andropov’s thinking — who implemented Andropov’s two principles. He pursued openness, or glasnost. He also pursued restructuring, or perestroika. He traded geopolitical interests, hard-won by the Red Army, for economic benefits. Contrary to his reputation in the West, Gorbachev was no liberal. He actually sought to preserve the Communist Party, and was prepared to restructure and open the system to do so.
As the security apparatus loosened its grip to facilitate openness and restructuring, the empire’s underlying tensions quickly went on display. When unrest in East Germany threatened to undermine Soviet control, Gorbachev had to make a strategic decision. If he used military force to suppress the uprising, probably restructuring and certainly openness would be dead, and the crisis Andropov foresaw would be upon him. Following Lenin’s principle, Gorbachev decided to trade space for time, and he accepted retreat from East Germany to maintain and strengthen his economic relations with the West.
After Gorbachev made that decision, the rest followed. If Germany were not to be defended, what would be defended? Applying his strategy rigorously, Gorbachev allowed the unwinding of the Eastern European empire without intervention. The decision he had made about Germany amounted to relinquishing most of Moscow’s World War II gains. But if regime survival required it, the price had to be paid.

The Crisis

The crisis came very simply. The degree of restructuring required to prevent the Soviet Union’s constituent republics from having an overarching interest in economic relations with the West rather than with Russia was enormous. There was no way to achieve it quickly. Given that the Soviet Union now had an official policy of ending its self-imposed enclosure, the apparent advantages to the constituent parts of protecting their economies from Western competition declined — and with them, the rationale for the Soviet Union. The security apparatus, the KGB, had been the engine driving glasnost and perestroika from the beginning; the advocates of the plan were not going to shift into reverse and suppress glasnost. But glasnost overwhelmed the system. The Soviet Union, unable to buy the time it needed to protect the Party, imploded. It broke apart into its constituent republics, and even parts of the Russian Federation seemed likely to break away.
What followed was liberalization only in the eyes of Westerners. It is easy to confuse liberalism with collapse, since both provide openness. But the former Soviet Union (FSU) wasn’t liberalizing, it was collapsing in every sense. What remained administratively was the KGB, now without a mission. The KGB was the most sophisticated part of the Soviet apparatus, and its members were the best and brightest. As privatization went into action, absent clear rules or principles, KGB members had the knowledge and sophistication to take advantage of it. As individuals and in factions, they built structures and relationships to take advantage of privatization, forming the factions that dominated the FSU throughout the 1990s until today. It is not reasonable to refer to organized crime in Russia, because Russia was lawless. In fact, the law enforcement apparatus was at the forefront of exploiting the chaos. Organized crime, business and the KGB became interconnected, and frequently identical.
The 1990s were a catastrophic period for most Russians. The economy collapsed. Property was appropriated in a systematic looting of all of the former Russian republics, with Western interests also rushing in to do quick deals on tremendously favorable terms. The new economic interests crossed the new national borders. (It is important to bear in mind that the boundaries that had separated Soviet republics were very real.) The financial cartels, named for the oligarchs who putatively controlled them (control was much more complex; many oligarchs were front men for more powerful and discreet figures), spread beyond the borders of the countries in which they originated, although the Russian cartels spread the most effectively.
Had the West — more specifically the United States — wanted to finish Russia off, this was the time. Russia had no effective government, poverty was extraordinary, the army was broken and the KGB was in a civil war over property. Very little pressure could well have finished off the Russian Federation.
The Bush and Clinton administrations made a strategic decision to treat Russia as the successor regime of the FSU, however, and refused to destabilize it further. Washington played an aggressive role in expanding NATO, but it did not try to break up the Russian Federation for several reasons. First, it feared nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of dangerous factions. Second, it did not imagine that Russia could ever be a viable country again. And third, it believed that if Russia did become viable, it would be a liberal democracy. (The idea that liberal democracies never threaten other liberal democracies was implanted in American minds.) What later became known as a neoconservative doctrine actually lay at the heart of the Clinton administration’s thinking.

Russia Regroups — and Faces the Same Crisis

Russia’s heart was the security apparatus. Whether holding it together or tearing it apart, the KGB — renamed the FSB after the Soviet collapse — remained the single viable part of the Russian state. It was therefore logical that when it became essential to end the chaos, the FSB would be the one to end it. Vladimir Putin, whom the KGB trained during Andropov’s tenure and who participated in the privatization frenzy in St. Petersburg, emerged as the force to recentralize Russia. The FSB realized that the Russian Federation itself faced collapse, and that excessive power had fallen out of its hands as FSB operatives had fought one another during the period of privatization.
Putin sought to restore the center in two ways. First, he worked to restore the central apparatus of the state. Second, he worked to strip power from oligarchs unaligned with the apparatus. It was a slow process, requiring infinite care so that the FSB not start tearing itself apart again, but Putin is a patient and careful man.
Putin realized that Andropov’s gamble had failed catastrophically. He also knew that the process could not simply be reversed; there was no going back to the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was possible to go back to the basic principles of the Soviet Union. First, there could be a union of the region, bound together by both economic weakness and the advantage of natural resource collaboration. Second, there was the reality of a transnational intelligence apparatus that could both stabilize the region and create the infrastructure for military power. And third, there was the reversal of the policy of trading geopolitical interests for financial benefits from the West. Putin’s view — and the average Russian’s view — was that the financial benefits of the West were more harmful than beneficial.
By 2008, when Russia defeated America’s ally, Georgia, in a war, the process of reassertion was well under way. Then, the financial crisis struck along with fluctuations in energy prices. The disparity between Russia’s politico-military aspirations, its military capability and its economic structure re-emerged. The Russians once again faced their classic situation: If they abandoned geopolitical interests, they would be physically at risk. But if they pursued their geopolitical interests, they would need a military force capable of assuming the task. Expanding the military would make the public unhappy as it would see resources diverted from public consumption to military production, and this could only be managed by increasing the power of the state and the security apparatus to manage the unhappiness. But this still left the risk of a massive divergence between military and economic power that could not be bridged by repression. This risk re-created the situation that emerged in the 1970s, had to be dealt with in the 1980s and turned into chaos in the 1990s.
The current decisions the Russians face can only be understood in the context of events that transpired 20 years ago. The same issues are being played out, and the generation that now governs Russia was forged in that crucible. The Russian leadership is trying to balance the possible outcomes to find a solution. They cannot trade national security for promised economic benefits that may not materialize or may not be usable. And they cannot simply use the security apparatus to manage increased military spending — there are limits to that.
As a generation ago, Russia is caught between the things that it must do to survive in the short run and the things it cannot do if they are to survive in the long run. There is no permanent solution for Russia, and that is what makes it such an unpredictable player in the international system. The closest Russia has come to a stable solution to its strategic problem was under Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, and even those could not hold for more than a generation.
The West must understand that Russia is never at peace with itself internally, and is therefore constantly shifting its external relationships in an endless, spasmodic cycle. Things go along for awhile, and then suddenly change. We saw a massive change 20 years ago, but the forces that generated that change had built up quietly in the generation before. The generation since has been trying to pull the pieces back together. But in Russia, every solution is merely the preface to the next problem — something built into the Russian reality.

Out of CIS

end of a relationship. Georgia looks forward to NATO and EU.

The two Georgias

a little explanation.

US military training

for the Georgian troops.

Hypothesizing on the Iran-Russia-U.S. Triangle

George Friedman
Stratfor
August 10

For the past several weeks, STRATFOR has focused on the relationship between Russia and Iran. As our readers will recall, a pro-Rafsanjani demonstration that saw chants of “Death to Russia,” uncommon in Iran since the 1979 revolution, triggered our discussion. It caused us to rethink Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Russia just four days after Iran’s disputed June 12 presidential election, with large-scale demonstrations occurring in Tehran. At the time, we ascribed Ahmadinejad’s trip as an attempt to signal his lack of concern at the postelection unrest. But why did a pro-Rafsanjani crowd chant “Death to Russia?” What had the Russians done to trigger the bitter reaction from the anti-Ahmadinejad faction? Was the Iranian president’s trip as innocent as it first looked?

A Net Assessment Re-examined

At STRATFOR, we proceed with what we call a “net assessment,” a broad model intended to explain the behavior of all players in a game. Our net assessment of Iran had the following three components:
Despite the rhetoric, the Iranian nuclear program was far from producing a deliverable weapon, although a test explosion within a few years was a distinct possibility.
Iran essentially was isolated in the international community, with major powers’ feelings toward Tehran ranging from hostile to indifferent. Again, rhetoric aside, this led Iran to a cautious foreign policy designed to avoid triggering hostility.
Russia was the most likely supporter of Iran, but Moscow would avoid becoming overly involved out of fears of the U.S. reaction, of uniting a fractious Europe with the United States and of being drawn into a literally explosive situation. The Russians, we felt, would fish in troubled waters, but would not change the regional calculus.

This view — in short, that Iran was contained — remained our view for about three years. It served us well in predicting, for example, that neither the United States nor Israel would strike Iran, and that the Russians would not transfer strategically significant weapons to Iran.
A net assessment is a hypothesis that must be continually tested against intelligence, however. The “Death to Russia” chant could not be ignored, nor could Ahmadinejad’s trip to Moscow.

More Free Intelligence

As we probed deeper, we found that Iran was swirling with rumors concerning Moscow’s relationship with both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Little could be drawn from the rumors. Iran today is a hothouse for growing rumors, and all our searches ended in dead ends. But then, if Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were engaging the Russians in this atmosphere, we would expect rumors and dead ends.
Interestingly, the rumors were consistent that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei wanted a closer relationship to Russia, but diverged on the Russian response. Some said the Russians already had assisted the Iranians by providing intelligence ranging from Israeli networks in Lebanon to details of U.S. and British plans to destabilize Iran through a “Green Revolution” like the color revolutions that had ripped through the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Equally interesting were our Russian sources’ responses. Normally, they are happy to talk, if only to try to mislead us. (Our Russian sources are nothing if not voluble.) But when approached about Moscow’s thinking on Iran, they went silent; this silence stood out. Normally, our sources would happily speculate — but on this subject, there was no speculation. And the disciplined silence was universal. This indicated that those who didn’t know didn’t want to touch the subject, and that those who did know were keeping secrets. None of this proved anything, but taken together, it caused us to put our net assessment for Iran on hold. We could no longer take any theory for granted.
All of the foregoing must be considered in the context of the current geopolitical system. And that is a matter of understanding what is in plain sight.
Potential Russian Responses to Washington
The U.S.-Russian summit that took place after the Iranian elections did not go well. U.S. President Barack Obama’s attempt to divide Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Putin did not bear fruit. The Russians were far more interested in whether Obama would change the FSU policy of former U.S. President George W. Bush. At the very least, the Russians wanted the Americans to stop supporting Ukraine’s and Georgia’s pro-Western tendencies.
But not only did Obama stick with the Bush policy, he dispatched U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to visit Ukraine and Georgia to drive home the continuity. This was followed by Biden’s interview with The Wall Street Journal, in which he essentially said the United States does not have to worry about Russia in the long run because Russia’s economic and demographic problems will undermine its power. Biden’s statements were completely consistent with the decision to send him to Georgia and Ukraine, so the Obama administration’s attempts to back away from the statement were not convincing. Certainly, the Russians were not convinced. The only conclusion the Russians could draw was that the United States regards them as a geopolitical cripple of little consequence.
If the Russians allow the Americans to poach in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence without responding, the Russian position throughout the FSU would begin to unravel — the precise outcome the Americans hope for. So Moscow took two steps. First, Moscow heated up the military situation near Georgia on the anniversary of the first war, shifting its posture and rhetoric and causing the Georgians to warn of impending conflict. Second, Moscow increased its strategic assertiveness, escalating the tempo of Russian air operations near the United Kingdom and Alaska, and more important, deploying two Akula-class hunter-killer submarines along the East Coast of the United States. The latter is interesting, but ultimately unimportant. Increased tensions in Georgia are indeed significant, however, since the Russians have decisive power in that arena — and can act if they wish against the country, one Biden just visited to express American support.
But even a Russian move against Georgia would not be decisive. The Americans have stated that Russia is not a country to be taken seriously, and that Washington will therefore continue to disregard Russian interests in the FSU. In other words, the Americans were threatening fundamental Russian interests. The Russians must respond, or by default, they would be accepting the American analysis of the situation — and by extension, so would the rest of the world. Obama had backed the Russians into a corner.
When we look at the geopolitical chessboard, there are two places where the Russians could really hurt the Americans.
One is Germany. If Moscow could leverage Germany out of the Western alliance, this would be a geopolitical shift of the first order. Moscow has leverage with Berlin, as the Germans depend on Russian natural gas, and the two have recently been working on linking their economies even further. Moreover, the Germans are as uneasy with Obama as they were with Bush. German and American interests no longer mesh neatly. The Russians have been courting the Germans, but a strategic shift in Germany’s position is simply not likely in any time frame that matters to the Russians at this juncture — though the leaders of the two countries are meeting once again this week in Sochi, Russia, their second meeting in as many months.
The second point where the Russians could hurt the Americans is in Iran. An isolated Iran is not a concern. An Iran with a strong relationship to Russia is a very different matter. Not only would sanctions be rendered completely meaningless, but Iran could pose profound strategic problems for the United States, potentially closing off airstrike options on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Real Nuclear Option

The real nuclear option for Iran does not involve nuclear weapons. It would involve mining the Strait of Hormuz and the narrow navigational channels that make up the Persian Gulf. During the 1980s, when Iran and Iraq were at war, both sides attacked oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. This raised havoc on oil prices and insurance rates.
If the Iranians were to successfully mine these waters, the disruption to 40 percent of the world’s oil flow would be immediate and dramatic. The nastiest part of the equation would be that in mine warfare, it is very hard to know when all the mines have been cleared. It is the risk, not the explosions, which causes insurance companies to withdraw insurance on vastly expensive tankers and their loads. It is insurance that allows the oil to flow.
Just how many mines Iran might lay before being detected and bringing an American military response could vary by a great deal, but there is certainly the chance that Iran could lay a significant number of mines, including more modern influence mines that can take longer to clear. The estimates and calculations of minesweepers — much less of the insurers — would depend on a number of factors not available to us here. But there is the possibility that the strait could be effectively closed to supertankers for a considerable period. The effect on oil prices would be severe; it is not difficult to imagine this aborting the global recovery.
Iran would not want this outcome. Tehran, too, would be greatly affected by the economic fallout (while Iran is a net exporter of crude, it is a net importer of gasoline), and the mining would drive the Europeans and Americans together. The economic and military consequences of this would be severe. But it is this threat that has given pause to American and Israeli military planners gaming out scenarios to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. There are thousands of small watercraft along Iran’s coast, and Iran’s response to such raids might well be to use these vessels to strew mines in the Persian Gulf — or for swarming and perhaps even suicide attacks.
Notably, any decision to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities would have to be preceded by (among other things) an attempt to neutralize Iran’s mine-laying capability — along with its many anti-ship missile batteries — in the Persian Gulf. The sequence is fixed, since the moment the nuclear sites are bombed, it would have to be assumed that the minelayers would go to work, and they would work as quickly as they could. Were anything else attacked first, taking out the Iranian mine capability would be difficult, as Iran’s naval assets would scatter and lay mines wherever and however they could — including by swarms of speedboats capable of carrying a mine or two apiece and almost impossible to engage with airpower. This, incidentally, is a leading reason why Israel cannot unilaterally attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. They would be held responsible for a potentially disastrous oil shortage. Only the Americans have the resources to even consider dealing with the potential Iranian response, because only the Americans have the possibility of keeping Persian Gulf shipping open once the shooting starts. It also indicates that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be much more complex than a sudden strike completed in one day.
The United States cannot permit the Iranians to lay the mines. The Iranians in turn cannot permit the United States to destroy their mine-laying capability. This is the balance of power that limits both sides. If Iran were to act, the U.S. response would be severe. If the United States moves to neutralize Iran, the Iranians would have to push the mines out fast. For both sides, the risks of threatening the fundamental interests of the other side are too high. Both Iran and the United States have worked to avoid this real “nuclear” option.

The Russian Existential Counter

The Russians see themselves facing an existential threat from the Americans. Whether Washington agrees with Biden or not, this is the stated American view of Russia, and by itself it poses an existential threat to Russia. The Russians need an existential counterthreat — and for the United States, that threat relates to oil. If the Russians could seriously threaten the supply of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would lose its relatively risk-free position in the FSU.
It follows from this that strengthening Iran’s ability to threaten the flow of oil, while retaining a degree of Russian control over Iran’s ability to pull the trigger, would give Russia the counter it needs to American actions in the FSU. The transfer of more advanced mines and mining systems to Iran — such as mines that can be planted now and activated remotely (though most such mines can only lay, planted and unarmed, for a limited period) to more discriminating and difficult-to-sweep types of mines — would create a situation the Americans could neither suppress nor live with. As long as the Russians could maintain covert control of the trigger, Moscow could place the United States, and the West’s economies, in check.
Significantly, while this would wreak havoc on Persian Gulf producers and global oil consumers at a time when they are highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations, a spike in the price of oil would not hurt Russia. On the contrary, Russia is an energy exporter, making it one of the few winners under this scenario. That means the Russians can afford much greater risks in this game.
We do not know that the Russians have all this in mind. This is speculation, not a net assessment. We note that if Russo-Iranian contacts are real, they would have begun well before the Iranian elections and the summit. But the American view on Russia is not new and was no secret. Therefore, the Russians could have been preparing their counter for a while.
We also do not know that the Iranians support this Russian move. Iranian distrust of Russia runs deep, and so far only the faction supporting Ahmadinejad appears to be playing this game. But the more the United States endorses what it calls Iranian reformists, and supports Rafsanjani’s position, the more Ahmadinejad needs the Russian counter. And whatever hesitations the Russians might have had in moving closer to the Iranians, recent events have clearly created a sense in Moscow of being under attack. The Russians think politically. The Russians play chess, and the U.S. move to create pressure in the FSU must be countered somewhere.
In intelligence, you must take bits and pieces and analyze them in the context of the pressures and constraints the various actors face. You know what you don’t know, but you still must build a picture of the world based on incomplete data. At a certain point, you become confident in your intelligence and analysis and you lock it into what STRATFOR calls its net assessment. We have not arrived at a new net assessment by any means. Endless facts could overthrow our hypothesis. But at a certain point, on important matters we feel compelled to reveal our hypothesis not because we are convinced, but simply because it is sufficiently plausible to us — and the situation sufficiently important — that we feel we should share it with the appropriate caveats. In this case, the stakes are very high, and the hypothesis sufficiently plausible that it is worth sharing.
The geopolitical chessboard is shifting, though many of the pieces are invisible. The end may look very different than this, but if it winds up looking this way, it is certainly worth noting.

Why Twitter and Facebook were blocked

a cyber attack lanched by Russians to kill "virtually" a Georgian blogger.

A year after conflict, Georgia still needs stability, OSCE Chairperson says

OSCE

ATHENS, 6 August 2009 - The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, said today she was concerned about tensions in the areas affected by the August 2008 conflict in Georgia and called on all sides to refrain from actions and statements that could destabilize the situation further."Almost a year after the beginning of the conflict, we are facing a highly sensitive time," she said. "Wounds are still raw, and the region remains fragile and volatile. Lives were lost during the conflict and after, and people forced to flee their homes lack the support they need to be able return to live in dignity."Bakoyannis emphasized that the OSCE remained involved in Georgia and hoped to ensure a strong presence for the Organization in the country to help strengthen security in the region."The OSCE is committed to helping to create lasting peace and security for the benefit of all peoples," she said.Bakoyannis said she regretted that the OSCE Mission to Georgia had to close earlier this year after working to improve the region's stability since 1992. The Mission's mandate expired at the end of 2008, and the Greek Chairmanship suspended negotiations to seek consensus around a new mandate in May, following months of intensive talks. At the end of June, the mandate for an OSCE deployment of unarmed military monitoring officers to Georgia expired and the Mission was closed."We remain focused on finding a solution that would enable the OSCE to have a strong presence in Georgia, and we hope that despite the difficulties so far, we will be able to find consensus on a format for such work. The Chairmanship's status-neutral proposal for the mandate remains on the table," she said. "Such a presence is needed now more than ever. I have said it often, and I will say it again: We need more OSCE in the region, not less."Bakoyannis said the OSCE was still working to improve security in the region - the Organization is co-chairing the Geneva Discussions along with the United Nations and the European Union.

"The Geneva Discussions are the only forum where all parties meet and discuss security and stability as well as humanitarian concerns," she said."Thanks to these discussions, there has been progress on important humanitarian matters, such as delivery of gas. The OSCE is also promoting joint efforts to improve the water supply with a view to ensuring access to potable and irrigation water by all populations. In addition, the OSCE is helping to facilitate meetings of a joint incident prevention and response mechanism, which enables regular contact between the sides for sharing information and discussing security concerns. We are committed to continuing these efforts and achieving results," she said.

The War in Georgia - one year after

Tensions on Ossetia boundary.

FACTBOX: Georgia's rebel regions one year after war
Reuters

August 4

The Russian-backed rebel regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were recognized by Moscow as independent states after a five-day war last August with Georgia.
A year on, only Nicaragua has followed suit. The rest of the world still considers the regions part of Georgia.
Following are brief profiles of the two rebel territories, which threw off Georgian rule in wars in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
ABKHAZIA:
* About 8,000 square km (3,088 square miles), Abkhazia is a lush strip of land on the Black Sea about half the size of Wales. Once the playground of the Soviet elite, the territory has ambitions to become a top tourist destination for Russians, who already account for 90 percent of holidaymakers.
* Abkhazia threw off Georgian rule in a 1992-93 war after Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union stoked fears among the Abkhaz that their influence in their homeland would be further diminished. After sporadic fighting, Georgia sent in the army and paramilitaries to stamp out calls for secession, only to be pushed back to the Inguri river -- today's de facto border -- by Abkhaz militias backed by Russian forces.
* The population of Abkhazia is around 200,000 people. Georgia says 200,000 ethnic Georgians and Mingrelians fled during the 1992-93 war. Around 60,000 have returned, mainly to the eastern Gali region adjacent to Georgia proper.
* As fighting raged last year in South Ossetia, Abkhazia seized the opportunity to take back the last corner of its territory, pushing Georgian police out of the Kodori gorge. Russia now controls its borders, and plans to build military bases, including a naval base at Ochamchire.
* A United Nations mission of some 130 monitors had observed the fragile peace since the 1992-93 war, but was forced to leave in July after Russia vetoed an extension to its mandate. Russia objected to a reference in a Western draft U.N. resolution which reaffirmed Georgia's territorial integrity.
* According to the Abkhaz authorities, 90 percent of foreign investment is Russian. Pensions are paid by Russia and the rouble is the currency. Tourism is Abkhazia's best hope of sustainable development.

SOUTH OSSETIA:
* Just 50 km (30 miles) from the Georgian capital Tbilisi at its nearest point, South Ossetia covers 3,900 square km (1,505 square miles) on the southern slopes of the Caucasus mountains. It has a population of some 63,000.
* South Ossetia broke away from Georgia in a 1991-92 war following Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union. It maintains close ties with the Russian region of North Ossetia on its northern border, with whose people it shares a common ethnicity and Farsi-related language. Self-styled president and former wrestler Eduard Kokoity told Reuters he hopes to unite South Ossetia with Russia.
* In August last year, after months of escalating tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi, Georgia launched an assault on the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, prompting a massive counter-strike from Russia. As in Abkhazia, Russia now controls South Ossetia's de facto borders. Most people hold Russian passports and the rouble is the currency.
* A small team of monitors of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had operated on the ground since the 1991-92 war, but was denied access after last year's war and has since been forced to close down after Russia rejected a Western proposal to extend its mandate.
* Tskhinvali was heavily shelled during last August's war, and reconstruction has been slow. Around 25,000 Georgians have been unable to return to their villages and thousands of Ossetians remain homeless.
* The economy is heavily dependent on Russian subsidies. Kokoity said Russia has allocated 8.5 billion roubles ($270 million) for this year, but local officials complain not all has made it to the region.
(Compiled by Moscow and Tbilisi bureaux)

The Russian Economy and Russian Power

George Friedman

Stratfor

July 27

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Georgia and Ukraine partly answered questions over how U.S.-Russian talks went during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia in early July. That Biden’s visit took place at all reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the principle that Russia does not have the right to a sphere of influence in these countries or anywhere in the former Soviet Union. The Americans’ willingness to confront the Russians on an issue of fundamental national interest to Russia therefore requires some explanation, as on the surface it seems a high-risk maneuver. Biden provided insights into the analytic framework of the Obama administration on Russia in a July 26 interview with The Wall Street Journal. In it, Biden said the United States “vastly” underestimates its hand. He added that “Russia has to make some very difficult, calculated decisions. They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years, they’re in a situation where the world is changing before them and they’re clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable.”

U.S. Policy Continuity

The Russians have accused the United States of supporting pro-American forces in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries of the former Soviet Union under the cover of supporting democracy. They see the U.S. goal as surrounding the Soviet Union with pro-American states to put the future of the Russian Federation at risk. The summer 2008 Russian military action in Georgia was intended to deliver a message to the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union that Russia was not prepared to tolerate such developments but was prepared to reverse them by force of arms if need be. Following his July summit, Obama sent Biden to the two most sensitive countries in the former Soviet Union — Ukraine and Georgia — to let the Russians know that the United States was not backing off its strategy in spite of Russian military superiority in the immediate region. In the long run, the United States is much more powerful than the Russians, and Biden was correct when he explicitly noted Russia’s failing demographics as a principle factor in Moscow’s long-term decline. But to paraphrase a noted economist, we don’t live in the long run. Right now, the Russian correlation of forces along Russia’s frontiers clearly favors the Russians, and the major U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan would prevent the Americans from intervening should the Russians choose to challenge pro-American governments in the former Soviet Union directly. Even so, Biden’s visit and interview show the Obama administration is maintaining the U.S. stance on Russia that has been in place since the Reagan years. Reagan saw the economy as Russia’s basic weakness. He felt that the greater the pressure on the Russian economy, the more forthcoming the Russians would be on geopolitical matters. The more concessions they made on geopolitical matters, the weaker their hold on Eastern Europe. And if Reagan’s demand that Russia “Tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev” was met, the Soviets would collapse. Ever since the Reagan administration, the idee fixe of not only the United States, but also NATO, China and Japan has been that the weakness of the Russian economy made it impossible for the Russians to play a significant regional role, let alone a global one. Therefore, regardless of Russian wishes, the West was free to forge whatever relations it wanted among Russian allies like Serbia and within the former Soviet Union. And certainly during the 1990s, Russia was paralyzed. Biden, however, is saying that whatever the current temporary regional advantage the Russians might have, in the end, their economy is crippled and Russia is not a country to be taken seriously. He went on publicly to point out that this should not be pointed out publicly, as there is no value in embarrassing Russia. The Russians certainly now understand what it means to hit the reset button Obama had referred to: The reset is back to the 1980s and 1990s.

Reset to the 1980s and 90s

To calculate the Russian response, it is important to consider how someone like Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin views the events of the 1980s and 1990s. After all, Putin was a KGB officer under Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB and later Chairman of the Communist Party for a short time — and the architect of glasnost and perestroika. It was the KGB that realized first that the Soviet Union was failing, which made sense because only the KGB had a comprehensive sense of the state of the Soviet Union. Andropov’s strategy was to shift from technology transfer through espionage — apparently Putin’s mission as a junior intelligence officer in Dresden in the former East Germany — to a more formal process of technology transfer. To induce the West to transfer technology and to invest in the Soviet Union, Moscow had to make substantial concessions in the area in which the West cared the most: geopolitics. To get what it needed, the Soviets had to dial back on the Cold War. Glasnost, or openness, had as its price reducing the threat to the West. But the greater part of the puzzle was perestroika, or the restructuring of the Soviet economy. This was where the greatest risk came, since the entire social and political structure of the Soviet Union was built around a command economy. But that economy was no longer functioning, and without perestroika, all of the investment and technology transfer would be meaningless. The Soviet Union could not metabolize it. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was a communist, as we seem to forget, and a follower of Andropov. He was not a liberalizer because he saw liberalization as a virtue; rather, he saw it as a means to an end. And that end was saving the Communist Party, and with it the Soviet state. Gorbachev also understood that the twin challenge of concessions to the West geopolitically and a top-down revolution in Russia economically — simultaneously—risked massive destabilization. This is what Reagan was counting on, and what Gorbachev was trying to prevent. Gorbachev lost Andropov’s gamble. The Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the Communist Party. What followed was a decade of economic horror, at least as most Russians viewed it. From the West’s point of view, collapse looked like liberalization. From the Russian point of view, Russia went from a superpower that was poor to an even poorer geopolitical cripple. For the Russians, the experiment was a double failure. Not only did the Russian Empire retreat to the borders of the 18th century, but the economy became even more dysfunctional, except for a handful of oligarchs and some of their Western associates who stole whatever wasn’t nailed down. The Russians, and particularly Putin, took away a different lesson than the West did. The West assumed that economic dysfunction caused the Soviet Union to fail. Putin and his colleagues took away the idea that it was the attempt to repair economic dysfunction through wholesale reforms that caused Russia to fail. From Putin’s point of view, economic well-being and national power do not necessarily work in tandem where Russia is concerned.

Russian Power, With or Without Prosperity

Russia has been an economic wreck for most of its history, both under the czars and under the Soviets. The geography of Russia has a range of weaknesses, as we have explored. Russia’s geography, daunting infrastructural challenges and demographic structure all conspire against it. But the strategic power of Russia was never synchronized to its economic well-being. Certainly, following World War II the Russian economy was shattered and never quite came back together. Yet Russian global power was still enormous. A look at the crushing poverty — but undeniable power — of Russia during broad swaths of time from 1600 until Andropov arrived on the scene certainly gives credence to Putin’s view. The problems of the 1980s had as much to do with the weakening and corruption of the Communist Party under former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as it had to do with intrinsic economic weakness. To put it differently, the Soviet Union was an economic wreck under Joseph Stalin as well. The Germans made a massive mistake in confusing Soviet economic weakness with military weakness. During the Cold War, the United States did not make that mistake. It understood that Soviet economic weakness did not track with Russian strategic power. Moscow might not be able to house its people, but its military power was not to be dismissed. What made an economic cripple into a military giant was political power. Both the czar and the Communist Party maintained a ruthless degree of control over society. That meant Moscow could divert resources from consumption to the military and suppress resistance. In a state run by terror, dissatisfaction with the state of the economy does not translate into either policy shifts or military weakness — and certainly not in the short term. Huge percentages of gross domestic product can be devoted to military purposes, even if used inefficiently there. Repression and terror smooth over public opinion. The czar used repression widely, and it was not until the army itself rebelled in World War I that the regime collapsed. Under Stalin, even at the worst moments of World War II, the army did not rebel. In both regimes, economic dysfunction was accepted as the inevitable price of strategic power. And dissent — even the hint of dissent — was dealt with by the only truly efficient state enterprise: the security apparatus, whether called the Okhraina, Cheka, NKVD, MGB or KGB. From the point of view of Putin, who has called the Soviet collapse the greatest tragedy of our time, the problem was not economic dysfunction. Rather, it was the attempt to completely overhaul the Soviet Union’s foreign and domestic policies simultaneously that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And that collapse did not lead to an economic renaissance. Biden might not have meant to gloat, but he drove home the point that Putin believes. For Putin, the West, and particularly the United States, engineered the fall of the Soviet Union by policies crafted by the Reagan administration — and that same policy remains in place under the Obama administration. It is not clear that Putin and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev disagree with Biden’s analysis — the Russian economy truly is “withering” — except in one sense. Given the policies Putin has pursued, the Russian prime minister must believe he has a way to cope with that. In the short run, Putin might well have such a coping mechanism, and this is the temporary window of opportunity Biden alluded to. But in the long run, the solution is not improving the economy — that would be difficult, if not outright impossible, for a country as large and lightly populated as Russia. Rather, the solution is accepting that Russia’s economic weakness is endemic and creating a regime that allows Russia to be a great power in spite of that. Such a regime is the one that can create military power in the face of broad poverty, something we will call the “Chekist state.” This state uses its security apparatus, now known as the FSB, to control the public through repression, freeing the state to allocate resources to the military as needed. In other words, this is Putin coming full circle to his KGB roots, but without the teachings of an Andropov or Gorbachev to confuse the issue. This is not an ideological stance; it applies to the Romanovs and to the Bolsheviks. It is an operational principle embedded in Russian geopolitics and history. Counting on Russian strategic power to track Russian economic power is risky. Certainly, it did in the 1980s and 1990s, but Putin has worked to decouple the two. On the surface, it might seem a futile gesture, but in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm. Obama seems to understand this to the extent that he has tried to play off Medvedev (who appears less traditional) from Putin (who appears to be the more traditional), but we do not think this is a viable strategy — this is not a matter of Russian political personalities but of Russian geopolitical necessity. Biden seems to be saying that the Reagan strategy can play itself out permanently. Our view is that it plays itself out only so long as the Russian regime doesn’t reassert itself with the full power of the security apparatus and doesn’t decouple economic and military growth. Biden’s strategy works so long as this doesn’t happen. But in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm and the past 20 years is the exception. A strategy that assumes the Russians will once again decouple economic and military power requires a different response than ongoing, subcritical pressure. It requires that the window of opportunity the United States has handed Russia by its wars in the Islamic world be closed, and that the pressure on Russia be dramatically increased before the Russians move toward full repression and rapid rearmament. Ironically, in the very long run of the next couple of generations, it probably doesn’t matter whether the West heads off Russia at the pass because of another factor Biden mentioned: Russia’s shrinking demographics. Russian demography has been steadily worsening since World War I, particularly because birth rates have fallen. This slow-motion degradation turned into collapse during the 1990s. Russia’s birth rates are now well below starkly higher death rates; Russia already has more citizens in their 50s than in their teens. Russia can be a major power without a solid economy, but no one can be a major power without people. But even with demographics as poor as Russia’s, demographics do not change a country overnight. This is Russia’s moment, and the generation or so it will take demography to grind Russia down can be made very painful for the Americans. Biden has stated the American strategy: squeeze the Russians and let nature take its course. We suspect the Russians will squeeze back hard before they move off the stage of history.

Obama, first trip in Moscow

Russia, urged to do not interfere in the neighbouring states.


White House blog - Defining the Reset

Meeting the post-Cold War generation


Iran issue - stop the Iranian weapons vs. missile defense shield

Europe's lost battle

A complacent strategy focusing on slow change rather than pressing crises is losing the EU its battle with Russia for influence in the eastern neighbourhood, according to a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations. The report predicts dire consequences for the six eastern neighbours of the EU - Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - as well as for the EU itself unless EU leaders improve their act and stop placing a lazy bet on a strategy of "enlargement-lite" - ignoring that the six countries are deep in the worst political and economic crisis since their independence. This irresponsible lack of attention means Europe risks another "August surprise" with Russia, like last year's Georgian war - this time over new elections in Moldova or another gas crisis in Ukraine. Yet the EU continues to pursue a strategy of incremental, long-term reform in the region, as most recently with the "Eastern Partnership" launched in May.
The report, entitled The limits of enlargement-lite: European and Russian power in the troubled neighbourhood, is based on extensive work by researchers mapping EU and Russian power in each of the six neighbourhood countries. The authors, Andrew Wilson and Nicu Popescu, argue that the EU urgently needs to rethink its approach to eastern Europe or face a ring of failing states and an increasingly active Russia rebuilding its sphere of influence.
Wilson and Popescu say:
The EU has reached the limits of its transformative power in eastern Europe. Without the accession carrot, the countries of the eastern neighbourhood will not naturally gravitate towards the EU, as Brussels policymakers seem all too often to assume. It's time for the EU to understand that if they do not help eastern European states to deal with the crises ravaging the region, Russia will.
Distrust and fatigue increasingly cloud the EU's relationship with its eastern neighbours. With Russia's influence growing, the EU must work to save the region from turning into a quagmire of half-reformed or failing states.
While the EU dithers, Russia has drastically overhauled its foreign policy since Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 and has developed new and effective ways of using soft and hard power in the neighbourhood. All neighbourhood countries, other than Belarus, trade more with the EU than Russia. But Russia skillfully uses its smaller economic muscle to gain bigger political clout through strategic investments and realist politics. Countries can do without IKEA, but they can't do without gas.
The single biggest factor identified for tarnishing the EU's soft power and standing in the neighbourhood is the restrictive, discriminatory, and opaque nature of its visa polices. Whereas Russia provides visa-free access and encourages migration, citizens of Ukraine and Moldova can no longer visit Schengen EU without visas. The EU does nothing to act on its vague long-term promise of eventual visa-free travel. For many migrant workers from the neighbourhood, it is Russia not "fortress Europe" who provides an opportunity for a better life.

The report's findings include:

Distrust between the neighbourhood and the EU is on the rise. Polling data analysed for the first time in this report shows that the EU needs to regain hearts and minds in the region. Moldova is the only neighbourhood country in which a majority of the population clearly favours integration with the EU over Russia. In Ukraine, the linchpin state of the region where EU approval is rapidly waning, 42% of the population is now in favour of integration with Russia, as opposed to 34% with the EU.
The neighbourhood is blighted by crises. Moldova's parliament has burned, Ukraine lives in fear of a Crimea flare-up, and Russian soldiers are less than 100 kilometers away from the Georgian capital. The damage caused by the economic crisis means there is a real risk of failed economies, if not failed states, on the EU border.
The consequences of the neighbourhood's crises for the EU are profound. A prolonged contest between the EU and Russia's ambitions for a "sphere of influence" over the neighbourhood is likely to increase tensions in EU-Russia relations and lead to further conflicts. Re-ignited hostilities and economic collapse could cause an influx of migrants. Several EU member states, notably Austria and Italy, are heavily exposed to the neighbourhood's imploding economies.
For the full text of the report: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR_ENP_report.pdf

Recommendations to EU policymakers:
Bureaucratic strategies like the Eastern Partnership urgently need to be complemented by dynamic, country-specific measures, to help the neighbourhood states resist short-term political and economic pressures. In Ukraine, an EU "political troubleshooter" should be tasked with resolving the political conflict that is paralysing the country. In Georgia, the EU must maintain its monitoring mission and step up efforts to resolve the crippling tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi. In Moldova, which is in danger of sliding into authoritarianism following contested elections in April, the EU should couple generous offers of aid with tough demands for reform of security agencies and an end to harassment of the media and opposition groups.
The EU must rekindle its appeal to neighbourhood states. Visa regimes for citizens of the neighbourhood countries urgently need to be liberalised. Sweden - which along with Poland was the inspiration for the Eastern Partnership - should use its EU presidency to get a high level EU troika to embark on a "listening tour" throughout the region and initiate a "27+6" foreign ministers meeting. To counter the perception that it is the motherland of bureaucracy and red tape, the EU should invest in innovative ways of supporting media freedom, such as a "new media school", and offer financial assistance for wireless internet access in Moldova and Georgia.
Without sacrificing its own interests or principles, the EU must look for ways to work with Russia to make the region more stable. This will help quell notions that the EU, by striving for influence in the Eastern neighbourhood, is essentially waging an ideological war against Russia. The EU should express its support from Medvedev's proposals for a "new European security architecture".

NOTES TO EDITORS:
Nicu Popescu is a Research Fellow at ECFR. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Central European University in Budapest. In 2005-2007, Nicu was a research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels and was previously a visiting fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris. Nicu runs a blog on the EU's neighbourhood and Russia for the EU Observer (in English) and a foreign policy blog in Romanian. He can be reached at nicu.popescu@ecfr.eu or press@ecfr.eu, or on +44 7795 312467 .
Andrew Wilson is a Senior Policy Fellow at ECFR. Previously he was a Reader in Ukrainian Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University College London and an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. His most recent books include Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. He can be reached at andrew.wilson@ecfr.eu or press@ecfr.eu, or by telephone on +44 7920 421066 .
This report, like all ECFR publications, represents the views of its authors, not the collective position of ECFR or its Council Members.
For all media enquiries please email press@ecfr.eu or telephone +44 20 7031 1623 .
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent and effective European values based foreign policy. http://www.ecfr.eu/
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NATO holds Georgia war games, Russia critical

Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili
AP
May 6

NATO launched military exercises in former Soviet Georgia on Wednesday after heavy criticism from neighboring Russia and a brief mutiny in the Georgian military.

Russia — which regards NATO as a Cold War relic with intrusive ambitions to expand into former Soviet countries — angrily dismissed as a "provocation" Georgian accusations that Tuesday's mutiny was a coup attempt engineered in Moscow.

Adding to tensions, Russia on Wednesday expelled two Canadian diplomats who worked at NATO offices in Moscow. The Foreign Ministry said the NATO employees' expulsion was meant as retaliation for the alliance's decision to kick out two Russian envoys from of its headquarters in Brussels, apparently over a February spy scandal.

"We, naturally, were forced to react," Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in televised comments Wednesday, adding the reciprocal measure was simply playing by the "rules of the game."

Georgia has stepped back from its initial allegations that Tuesday's mutiny was orchestrated by Moscow to topple Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, and now say it was aimed at disrupting the NATO exercises.

Hundreds of Georgian soldiers surrendered late Tuesday after a daylong standoff at the Mukhrovani tank battalion headquarters near the capital, Tbilisi, during which they had barred the defense minister from entering and declared they would refused to follow orders.

Some Georgian opposition members called the mutiny a charade, cooked up by Saakashvili to rally disgruntled Georgians around the beleaguered president. Opposition supporters have protested for weeks in the capital, accusing the president of corruption, mismanagement and provoking Georgia's August war with Russia.

Russian-Georgian relations have been tense since the pro-Western Saakashvili came to power amid a popular revolution in 2003, and worsened after the war and Russia's recognition of two breakaway Georgian regions.

Russia is also annoyed at Georgia courting closer ties with NATO, the United States and the European Union, and is especially riled by the NATO military exercises under way at a military base near Tbilisi — not far from the base at which Tuesday's revolt occurred.

Russian officials view the war games as a typical manifestation of Western meddling, and have accused the alliance of intervening in Georgia's domestic politics by holding the exercises.

Georgian Defense Ministry spokesman David Dzhokhadze told The Associated Press that no battlefield maneuvers were planned until at least May 11, and meetings would dominate proceedings until then.

Georgia expects 15 countries to take part in the NATO exercises, Dzhokhadze said, Switzerland, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia said they would not take part. Armenia has also said it would bow out, but Dzhokhadze said Georgia has yet to be notified.

Associated Press writer David Nowak contributed to this report from Moscow.

Thousands protest in Georgia for 3rd day

Lynn Berry

AP

April 11

Thousands of people marched through Georgia's capital Saturday on the third day of peaceful protests demanding the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili.

Despite a steady decline in the number of demonstrators each day, their leaders vowed to resume the daily protests with new vigor after a break for Palm Sunday, which Georgians and other Orthodox Christians celebrate Sunday.

Georgia's interior minister, who controls the police, said he was convinced the protests were effectively over.

Saakashvili, whose second term runs through 2013, has countered the protests by calling for talks with his opponents.

The protest leaders, who head more than a dozen opposition parties, have long shunned talks. But on Friday they said they were willing to talk to the president, if certain conditions were met.

No talks have been scheduled, but European Union special representative Peter Semneby said he was in touch with both sides to help bring them together. "It's in the air that this could happen," he told The Associated Press.

The protesters are most angry with Saakashvili over his handling of the brief war last summer with Russia. The Georgian army fled ahead of invading Russian troops, and the country lost territory as separatists and their Russian allies took full control of two breakaway Georgian regions.

Saakashvili's actions during the war "were not mistakes," said Maria Loladze, 82. "He should be put on trial."

The protesters also accuse the president of concentrating power in his hands and embarrassing his countrymen by his erratic behavior.

Many Georgians still support Saakashvili, who has overseen significant economic growth, although he faces criticism for not doing enough to help the poor and create jobs.

The crowds have steadily diminished since the protests began on Thursday, when tens of thousands of protesters packed the capital's central avenue.

About 10,000 people protested Saturday in three locations: in front of parliament, outside Saakashvili's residence and at the headquarters of the main state television channel, where they called for the demonstrations to be broadcast live.

At the president's residence, protesters threw carrots and released a rabbit onto the grounds, a reference to their claims that Saakashvili behaved like a coward during the war.

Both the opposition and the government have expressed a commitment for the protests to take place peacefully. Police have not intervened, even when protesters have blocked traffic.

Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili said Friday that police would not disperse the protests no matter how long they continued. "But it's already over," he told the AP.

Opposition leaders said they were disappointed there has been no response from Saakashvili's administration to their expressed readiness to hold talks.

But the opposition offer was not clear.

Some opposition leaders said they would only agree to talks on live television and that the only subject to be discussed was Saakashvili's departure.

Others were open to different formats.

Associated Press writer Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili contributed to this report.

Georgia's president under pressure to resign

Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili
AP
April 9

Tens of thousands of protesters thronged the streets in front of Georgia's parliament Thursday, calling on the president to step down in the largest opposition demonstration since last year's war with Russia.

The opposition blames President Mikhail Saakashvili, a U.S.-educated lawyer who has built close ties to Washington, for the disastrous war last August and says he cannot lead Georgia forward because of his antagonistic relationship with Moscow.

Saakashvili, meanwhile, has vowed to serve out his term, which ends in 2013.

The protest was held on the 20th anniversary of a deadly anti-Soviet demonstration that galvanized Georgia's fight for self-determination and led to Georgia declaring its independence two years later.

Tira Guledani, a 70-year-old psychologist called Saakashvili mentally ill and said many Georgian remain upset for the war with Russia.

"You have to treat him, he is sick," she said. "We want normal relations with Russia, not war. We lived well with Russia. He spoiled everything."

Nearby, Georgy Kirvalidze, a 19-year-old student, pointed at a wall bearing a well-known photograph of Saakashvili cowering under bodyguards during a Russian attack last August.

"Our president is a coward. Cowards are always cruel," he said.

Earlier, Saakashvili made an unexpected visit to a memorial honoring the victims of the 1989 demonstration, located in front of parliament.

"We have to be steadfast and united," the president told reporters as he approached the memorial, where a few hundred people, including some opposition leaders, were gathered. A banner saying "People for Saakashvili's Resignation" hung overhead.

Police forces have promised not to intervene, but the city was on edge, with residents fearing the protests could lead to violence. Ahead of the demonstration, there was little visible police presence.

Among the politicians who joined the opposition after the war are former parliament speaker Nino Burdzhanadze, who was one of Saakashvili's closest allies, and Irakli Alasania, who was Georgia's ambassador to the United Nations. Former Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili was also to lead a group of protesters.

"They will elect a new government that will have their trust and strong support and also will have a real chance to begin a dialogue with Russia," Alasania said before the protest.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has said he would refuse to deal at all with Saakashvili, whom Russian leaders depict as bloodthirsty and unbalanced.

Saakashvili called Tuesday for talks with the opposition but was rebuffed.

"There can be dialogue with the government only on one issue — the resignation of Mikhail Saakashvili," said Levan Gachechiladze, who challenged Saakashvili in the 2008 presidential election.

Some Georgians continue to support Saakashvili, who has presided over substantial economic growth.

For others, Saakashvili was discredited by defeat in the five-day war. It set back his goal of regaining control over two Russian-backed separatist regions.

"Let's imagine we live in a civilized European country, as the current president likes to imagine Georgia to be, and its leader starts a war that he loses disgracefully," said Georgy Tarkhnishvili, 40, a physicist. "Does he stay in power? Of course not."

Associated Press Writer Lynn Berry contributed to this report from Tbilisi.

See also:

Red Alert: A Possible Revolution Simmering in Georgia

Stratfor
April 8

VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images

Georgian opposition politicians making a statement in Tbilisi on March 27

Georgian opposition movements have planned mass protests for April 9, mostly in Tbilisi but also around the country. These protests could spell trouble for President Mikhail Saakashvili. The Western-leaning president has faced protests before, but this time the opposition is more consolidated than in the past. Furthermore, some members of the government are expected to join in the protests, and Russia has stepped up its efforts to oust Saakashvili.

Opposition parties inside Georgia are planning mass protests for April 9, mainly in the capital city of Tbilisi but also across the country. The protests are against President Mikhail Saakashvili and are expected to demand his resignation. This is not the first set of rallies against Saakashvili, who has had a rocky presidency since taking power in the pro-Western “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Anti-government protests have been held constantly over the past six years. But the upcoming rally is different: This is the first time all 17 opposition parties have consolidated enough to organize a mass movement in the country. Furthermore, many members of the government are joining the cause, and foreign powers — namely Russia — are known to be encouraging plans to oust Saakashvili.

The planned protests in Georgia have been scheduled to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Soviet crackdown on independence demonstrators in Tbilisi. The opposition movement claims that more than 100,000 people will take to the streets — an ambitious number, as the protests of the past six years have not drawn more than 15,000 people. But this time around, the Georgian people’s discontent is greatly intensified because of the blame placed on Saakashvili after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Most Georgians believe Saakashvili pushed the country into a war, knowing the repercussions, and into a serious financial crisis in which unemployment has reached nearly 9 percent.

Georgia’s opposition has always been fractured and so has only managed to pull together sporadic rallies rather than a real movement. But the growing discontent in Georgia is allowing the opposition groups to finally overcome their differences and agree that Saakashvili should be removed. Even Saakashvili loyalists like former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania have joined the opposition’s cause, targeting Saakashvili personally. The problem now is that opposition members still do not agree on how to remove the president; some are calling for referendums on new elections, and some want to install a replacement government to make sure Saakashvili does not have a chance to return to power. But all 17 parties agreed to start with large-scale demonstrations in the streets and go from there.

If the movement does inspire such a large turnout, it would be equivalent to the number of protesters that hit the streets at the height of the Rose Revolution, which toppled the previous government and brought Saakashvili into power in the first place.

Saakashvili and the remainder of his supporters are prepared, however, with the military on standby outside of Tbilisi in order to counter a large movement. During a demonstration in 2007, Saakashvili deployed the military and successfully — though violently — crushed the protests. But that demonstration consisted of 15,000 protesters; it is unclear if Saakashvili and the military could withstand numbers seven times that.

(click image to enlarge)

There is also concern that protests are planned in the Georgian secessionist region of Adjara, which rose up against and rejected Saakashvili’s government in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. This region was suppressed by Saakashvili once and has held a grudge ever since, looking for the perfect time to rise up again. Tbilisi especially wants to keep Adjara under its control because it is home to the large port of Batumi, and many of Georgia’s transport routes to Turkey run through it. If Adjara rises up, there are rumors in the region that its neighboring secessionist region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, will join in to help destabilize Saakashvili and the government. Georgia already officially lost its two northern secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian occupation during the August 2008 war and is highly concerned with its southern regions trying to break away.

These southern regions, like the northern ones, have strong support from Russia; thus, Moscow is square in the middle of tomorrow’s activities. Russia has long backed all of Georgia’s secessionist regions, but has had difficulty penetrating the Georgian opposition groups in order to organize them against Saakashvili. Though none of the 17 opposition groups are pro-Russian, STRATFOR sources in Georgia say Russian money has been flowing into the groups in order to nudge them along in organizing the impending protests.

Russia has a vested interest in breaking the Georgian government. Russia and the West have been locked in a struggle over the small Caucasus state. That struggle led to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, after which Moscow felt secure in its control over Georgia. Since Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama met April 1 and disagreed over a slew of issues, including U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is not as secure and is seeking to consolidate its power in Georgia. This means first breaking the still vehemently pro-Western Saakashvili. This does not mean Russia thinks it can get a pro-Russian leader in power in Georgia; it just wants one who is not so outspoken against Moscow and so determined to invite Western influence.

The April 9 protests are the point at which all sides will try to gain — and maintain — momentum. The 2003 Rose Revolution took months to build up to, but the upcoming protests are the starting point for both the opposition and Russia — and opposition movements in Georgia have not seen this much support and organization since the 2003 revolution. April 9 will reveal whether or not things are about to get shaken up, if not completely transformed, in Georgia.