Kurile's heel

What's the interest of Russia to have tensed relations with Japan, following the latest visit of Russian president to the controversial Kurile Islands? Russia never played one single card and the situation from the Asian continent, confronted with uncertain future in the Korean Peninsula, a China ready to conquer the world and the next visit of president Obama in India, an important piece of the puzzle during the Cold War.

Pros and cons for Obama's prize

Congratulations from Cuba and Russia, harsh critics from the Republicans.

The BMD Decision and the Global System

George Friedman

Stratfor

September 21

The United States announced late Sept. 17 that it would abandon a plan for placing ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead of the planned system, which was intended to defend primarily against a potential crude intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat from Iran against the United States, the administration chose a restructured system that will begin by providing some protection to Europe using U.S. Navy ships based on either the North or Mediterranean seas. The Obama administration has argued that this system will be online sooner than the previously planned system and that follow-on systems will protect the United States. It was also revealed that the latest National Intelligence Estimate finds that Iran is further away from having a true intercontinental missile capability than previously thought, meaning protecting Europe is a more pressing concern than protecting the United States.
Poland and the Czech Republic responded with a sense of U.S. betrayal, while Russia expressed its satisfaction with the decision. Russian envoy to NATO Dmitri Rogozin said Moscow welcomes the decision and sees it as an appropriate response to Russia’s offer to allow U.S. supplies to flow into Afghanistan through Russia. Later, the Russians added another reward: They tentatively announced the cancellation of plans to deploy short-range ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, which they previously had planned as a response to the components of the U.S. BMD system planned for Poland and the Czech Republic.

Polish Despair and Russian Delight

Polish despair (and Warsaw seemed far more upset than Prague) and Russian satisfaction must be explained to begin to understand the global implications. To do this, we must begin with an odd fact: The planned BMD system did not in and of itself enhance Polish national security in any way even if missiles had actually targeted Warsaw, since the long-range interceptors in Poland were positioned there to protect the continental United States; missiles falling on Poland would likely be outside the engagement envelope of the original Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors. The system was designed to handle very few missiles originating from the Middle East, and the Russians obviously have more than a few missiles.
Given that even small numbers of missiles easily could overwhelm the system, the BMD system in no way directly affected Russian national security: The Russian strike capability — against both Poland and the continental United States — was not affected at all. Indeed, placing the system on ships is no less threatening than placing them on land. So, if it was the BMD system the Russians were upset with, they should be no less upset by the redeployment at sea. Yet Moscow is pleased by what has happened — which means the BMD system was not really the issue.

For Poland, the BMD system was of little importance. What was important was that in placing the system in Poland, the United States obviously was prepared to defend the system from all threats. Since the system could not be protected without also protecting Poland, the BMD installation — and the troops and defensive systems that would accompany it — was seen as a U.S. guarantee on Polish national security even though the system itself was irrelevant to Polish security.

The Russians took the same view. They cared little about the BMD system itself; what they objected to was the presence of a U.S. strategic capability in Poland because this represented an American assertion that Poland was actively under the defense of the United States. Of particular note from the Russian point of view was that such a guarantee would be independent of NATO. The NATO alliance has seen better days, and the Russians (and Poles) perceive an implicit American security guarantee as more threatening than an explicit one from NATO.

This whole chain of events was an exercise in the workings of the Post-Post-Cold War World, in which Russia is a strong regional power seeking to protect its influence in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and to guarantee its frontiers as well — something that in the West has often been misinterpreted as a neurotic need for respect. Poland is the traditional route through which Russia is invaded, and the Russian view is that governments and intentions change but capabilities do not. Whatever Washington intends now, it is asserting dominance in a region that has been the route for three invasions over the last two centuries. By the Russian logic, if the United States has no interest in participating in such an invasion, it should not be interested in Poland. If the United States chooses Poland of all places to deploy its BMD when so many other locations were willing and possible, the Russians are not prepared to regard this choice as merely coincidence.

Overall, the Russians desire a new map of the region, one with two layers. First, Russia must be recognized as the dominant power in the former Soviet Union. The United States and Europe must shape bilateral relations with other former Soviet states within the framework of this understanding. Second, Central Europe — and particularly Poland — must not become a base for U.S. power. The United States and Europe must accept that Russia has no aggressive intent, but more to the point, Poland in particular must become a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Germany. It can sign whatever treaties it wants, attend whatever meetings it wishes and so forth, but major military formations of other great powers must remain out of Poland. Russia sees the BMD system as the first step in militarizing Poland, and the Russians have acted accordingly.

From the standpoint of the Bush administration and the Obama administration early on, the Russian claims to great power status, rights in the former Soviet Union and interests in Poland represented a massive overreach. The perception of both administrations derived from an image developed in the 1990s of Russia as crippled. The idea of Russia as a robust regional power, albeit with significant economic problems, simply didn’t register. There were two generations at work. The older Cold War generation did not trust Russian intentions and wanted to create a cordon around Russia — including countries like Georgia, Ukraine and, most important, Poland — because Russia could become a global threat again. The newer post-Cold War generation — which cut its teeth in the 1990s — wanted to ignore Russia and do what it wished both in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union because Russia was no longer a significant power, and the generation saw the need to develop a new system of relationships. In the end, all this congealed in the deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.

For Russia, Poland mattered in ways the United States could not grasp given its analytic framework. But the United States had its own strategic obsession: Iran.

Iran: The U.S. Strategic Obsession

The Islamic world has been the focus of the United States since 9/11. In this context, the development of an Iranian nuclear capability was seen as a fundamental threat to U.S. national interests. The obvious response was a military strike to destroy Iranian power, but both the Bush and Obama administrations hesitated to take the step.

First, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be no one-day affair. Intelligence on precise locations had uncertainty built into it, and any strike would consist of multiple phases: destroying Iran’s air force and navy, destroying Iran’s anti-aircraft capability to guarantee total command of the skies, the attacks on the nuclear facilities themselves, analysis of the damage, perhaps a second wave, and of course additional attacks to deal with any attempted Iranian retaliation. The target set would be considerable, and would extend well beyond the targets directly related to the nuclear program, making such an operation no simple matter.

Second, Iran has the ability to respond in a number of ways. One is unleashing terrorist attacks worldwide via Hezbollah. But the most significant response would be blocking the Strait of Hormuz using either anti-ship missiles or naval mines. The latter are more threatening largely because the clearing operation could take a considerable period and it would be difficult to know when you had cleared all of the mines. Tankers and their loads are worth about $170 million at current prices, and that uncertainty could cause owners to refuse the trip. Oil exports could fall dramatically, and the effect on the global economy — particularly now amid the global financial crisis — could be absolutely devastating. Attacking Iran would be an air-sea battle, and could even include limited ground forces inserted to ensure that the nuclear facilities were destroyed.

The country most concerned with all of this is Israel. The Iranians had given every indication that they plan to build a nuclear capability and use it against Israel. Israel’s vulnerability to such a strike is enormous, and there are serious questions about Israel’s ability to use the threat of a counterstrike as a deterrent to such a strike. In our view, Iran is merely creating a system to guarantee regime survival, but given the tenor of Tehran’s statements, Israel cannot afford to take this view complacently.
Israel could unilaterally draw the United States into an airstrike on Iran. Were Israel to strike Iran by any means, it most likely would lack the ability to conduct an extended air campaign. And the United States could not suffer the consequences of airstrikes without the benefits of taking out Iran’s nuclear program. Apart from the political consequences, the U.S. Navy would be drawn into the suppression of Iranian naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf whether it wanted to or not simply to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Even if Iran didn’t act to close off the strait, Washington would have to assume that it might, an eventuality it could not afford. So an Israeli attack would likely draw in the United States against Iran one way or another. The United States has had no appetite for such an eventuality, particularly since it considers a deliverable Iranian nuclear weapon a ways off. The U.S. alternative — in both administrations — was diplomatic.

Israel and Complications to the Diplomatic Alternative

Washington wanted to create a coalition of powers able to impose sanctions on Iran. At meetings over the summer, the Obama administration appears to have promised Israel “crippling” sanctions to prevent any unilateral Israel action. At an April G-8 meeting, it was decided that Iran must engage in serious negotiations on its nuclear program prior to the next G-8 meeting — on Sept. 24 — or face these sanctions.

The crippling sanctions foreseen were some sort of interruption of the flow of gasoline into Iran, which imports 40 percent of its supply despite being a net exporter of crude. Obviously, in order for this to work, all of the G-8 nations (and others) must participate, particularly Russia. Russia has the capacity to produce and transport all of Iran’s needs, not just its import requirements. If the Russians don’t participate, there are no sanctions.

The Russians announced weeks ago that they opposed new sanctions on Iran and would not participate in them. Moreover, they seemed to flout the ineffectiveness of any U.S. sanctions. With that, the diplomatic option on Iran was off the table. Russia is not eager to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, but it sees the United States as the greater threat at the moment. Moscow’s fundamental fear is that the United States — and Israel — will dramatically strengthen Ukraine, Georgia and other states in the FSU and on its periphery, and that Russia’s strategic goal of national security through pre-eminence in the region will be lost.

From the Russian point of view, the U.S. desire for Russian help with Iran is incompatible with the U.S. desire to pursue its own course in the FSU and countries like Poland. From the U.S. point of view, these were two entirely different matters that should be handled in a different venue. But Washington didn’t get to choose in this matter. This was a Russian decision. The Russians faced what they saw as an existential threat, believing that the U.S. strategy threatened the long-term survival of the Russian Federation. The Russians were not prepared to support a U.S. solution for Iran without American support on Russian concerns. The Americans ultimately did not understand that the Russians had shifted out of the era in which the United States could simply dictate to them. Now, the United States had to negotiate with the Russians on terms Moscow set, or the United States would have to become more directly threatening to Russia. Becoming more threatening was not an option with U.S. forces scattered all over the Middle East. Therefore, the United States had to decide what it wanted.

American attention in the run-up to the Oct. 1 talks with Iran was focused by Israel. The Obama administration had adopted an interesting two-tier position on Israel. On the one hand, it was confronting Israel on halting settlement activity in the West Bank; on the other hand, it was making promises to Israel on Iran. The sense in Israel was that the Obama administration was altering Washington’s traditional support for Israel. Since Iran was a critical threat to Israel, and since Israel might not have a better chance to strike than now, the Obama administration began to realize that its diplomatic option had failed, and that the decision on war and peace with Iran was not in its hands but in Israel’s, since Israel was prepared to act unilaterally and draw the United States into a war. Given that the Obama diplomatic initiative had failed and that the administration’s pressure on Israel had created a sense of isolation in Israel, the situation could now well spiral out of control.

Although all of these things operated in different bureaucratic silos in Washington, and participants in each silo could suffer under the illusion that the issues were unrelated, the matters converged hurriedly last week. Uncertain what leverage it had over Israel, the United States decided to reach out to the Russians. Washington sought a way to indicate to the Russians that it was prepared to deal with Russia in a different way while simultaneously giving away as little as possible. That little was the redeployment of BMD components originally planned for Poland and the Czech Republic to ships. (Money already has been allocated to upgrade additional Atlantic-based Aegis warships to BMD capability.) Whatever the military and engineering issues involved, whatever the desire not to conflate U.S. strategic relations with Israel with pressure on the settlement issue, whatever the desire to “reset” relations without actually giving the Russians anything, the silos collapsed and a gesture was made.
From the Russian point of view, the gesture is welcome but insufficient. They are not going to solve a major strategic problem for the United States simply in return for moving the BMD. For that, the United States got access to Afghanistan through Russia if desired, and the removal of missiles in Kaliningrad. The Americans also got a different atmosphere at meetings between U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev at the United Nations next week. But the sine qua non for Russian help on Iran is Russia’s sphere of influence in the FSU. The public relations aspect of how this sphere is announced is not critical. That the U.S. agrees to it is.

This is the foreign policy test all U.S. presidents face. Obama now has three choices.

He can make the deal with Russia. But every day that passes, Russia is creating the reality of domination in the FSU, so its price for a deal will continue to rise from simply recognizing their sphere of influence to extending it to neutralizing Poland.

He can select the military option of an air campaign against Iran. But this means accepting the risk to maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf and the potentially devastating impact on the global economy if oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz are impacted significantly.

He can wait to see how things unfold, and place overwhelming pressure on Israel not to attack. But this means finding a way to place the pressure: Israel in 2009 does not have the dependence on the United States it had in 1973.

The Importance of Poland

Ultimately, the question of Iran is secondary. The question of U.S.-Russian relations is now paramount. And ultimately, policymakers don’t really have as much freedom to make choices as they would like. Under any of these scenarios, the United States doesn’t have the power to stop Russian dominance in the FSU, but it does have the ability to block further Russian expansion on the North European Plain. Preventing an amalgamation between Russia and Europe is a fundamental interest to the United States; neutralizing Poland and depending on Germany as the Russian-European frontier is not inviting — especially as Germany has no interest in reprising the role it played from 1945 to 1991.

The United States has an Iran crisis, but it is not its fundamental geopolitical problem. Interestingly, the Iran crisis is highlighting the real issue, which is Russia. It is Russia that is blocking a solution to Iran because Russian and American interests have profoundly diverged. What is emerging from Iran is the issue of Russia. And obviously, when Russia becomes an issue, so does Poland. If the United States acts to limit Russia, it will act in Poland, and not with BMD systems.

The Obama administration’s decision to withdraw BMD is insufficient to entice Russia into assisting with Iran. An agreement to respect Russian rights in the FSU would be sufficient (and in a way would merely recognize what is already in place). Obama might quietly give that assurance. But if he does, the United States will not add Poland to the pile of concessions. The greater the concessions in the FSU, the more important Poland becomes. The idea of conceding both Russian hegemony in the FSU and the neutralization of Poland in exchange for Russian pressure on Iran is utterly disproportionate.

The United States has already completed delivery of 48 late-model F-16C/Ds with advanced offensive capabilities to Poland. That matters far more to Polish national security than BMD. In the U.S. tradition with allies — particularly allies with strong lobbies in the United States, where the Polish lobby is immense — disappointment on one weapon system usually results in generosity with other, more important systems (something the Poles must learn).

As the United States has a strong military option in Iran, redrawing the map of Europe to avoid using that option — regardless of Polish fears at the moment — is unlikely. Moreover, Washington also could decide to live with an Iranian nuclear capability without redrawing the map of Europe. Ultimately, the United States has made a gesture with little content and great symbolic meaning. It is hoping that the Russians are overwhelmed by the symbolism. They won’t be.

For their part, the Russians are hoping the Americans panic over Iran. The fact is that while Russia is a great regional power, it is not that great, and its region is not that critical. The Russians may be betting that Obama will fold. They made the same bet on John F. Kennedy. Obama reads the same reports that we do about how the Russians believe him to be weak and indecisive. And that is a formula for decisive — if imprudent — action.

Bomb attack

in Ingushetia.

The U.S.-Russian Summit Turns Routine

George Friedman

Stratfor

The Moscow summit between U.S. President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has ended. As is almost always the case, the atmospherics were good, with the proper things said on all sides and statements and gestures of deep sincerity made. And as with all summits, those atmospherics are like the air: insubstantial and ultimately invisible. While there were indications of substantial movement, you would have needed a microscope to see them. An agreement was reached on what an agreement on nuclear arms reduction might look like, but we do not regard this as a strategic matter. The number of strategic warheads and delivery vehicles is a Cold War issue that concerned the security of each side’s nuclear deterrent. We do not mean to argue that removing a thousand or so nuclear weapons is unimportant, but instead that no one is deterring anyone these days, and the risk of accidental launch is as large or as small whether there are 500 or 5,000 launchers or warheads. Either way, nuclear arms’ strategic significance remains unchanged. The summit perhaps has created a process that could lead to some degree of confidence. It is not lack of confidence dividing the two countries, however, but rather divisions on fundamental geopolitical issues that don’t intersect with the missile question.

The Fundamental Issues

There are dozens of contentious issues between the United States and Russia, but in our mind three issues are fundamental. First, there is the question of whether Poland will become a base from which the United States can contain Russian power, or from the Russian point of view, threaten the former Soviet Union. The ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that the United States has slated for Poland does not directly affect that issue, though it symbolizes it. It represents the U.S. use of Polish territory for strategic purposes, and it is something the Russians oppose not so much for the system’s direct or specific threat — which is minimal — but for what it symbolizes about the Americans’ status in Poland. The Russians hoped to get Obama to follow the policy at the summit that he alluded to during his campaign for the U.S. presidency: namely, removing the BMD program from Poland to reduce tensions with Russia. Second, there is the question of Iran. This is a strategic matter for the United States, perhaps even more pressing since the recent Iranian election. The United States badly needs to isolate Iran effectively, something impossible without Russian cooperation. Moscow has refused to join Washington on this issue, in part because it is so important to the United States. Given its importance to the Americans, the Russians see Iran as a lever with which they can try to control U.S. actions elsewhere. The Americans do not want to see Russian support, and particularly arms sales, to Iran. Given that, the Russians don’t want to close off the possibility of supporting Iran. The United States wanted to see some Russian commitments on Iran at the summit. And third, there is the question of U.S. relations with former Soviet countries other than Russia, and the expressed U.S. desire to see NATO expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians insist that any such expansion threatens Russian national security and understandings with previous U.S. administrations. The United States insists that no such understandings exist, that NATO expansion doesn’t threaten Russia, and that the expansion will continue. The Russians were hoping the Americans would back off on this issue at the summit. Of some importance, but not as fundamental as the previous issues, was the question of whether Russia will allow U.S. arms shipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory. This issue became important last winter when Taliban attacks on U.S. supply routes through Pakistan intensified, putting the viability of those routes in question. In recent months the Russians have accepted the transit of nonlethal materiel through Russia, but not arms. Even before the summit, the Russians made a concession on this point, giving the United States the right to transit military equipment via Russian airspace. This was a significant policy change designed to demonstrate Russia’s flexibility. At the same time, the step is not as significant as it appeared. The move cost the Russians little under the circumstances, and is easily revoked. And while the United States might use the route, the route is always subject to Russian pressure, meaning the United States is not going to allow a strategic dependence to develop. Moreover, the U.S. need is not as apparent now as it was a few months ago. And finally, a Talibanized Afghanistan is not in the Russian interest. That Russia did not grant the U.S. request last February merely reveals how bad U.S.-Russian relations were at the time. Conversely, the Russian concession on the issue signals that U.S.-Russian relations have improved. The concession was all the more significant in that it came after Obama praised Medvedev for his openness and criticized Putin as having one foot in the Cold War, clearly an attempt to play the two Russian leaders off each other.

What the Summit Produced

Much more significantly, the United States did not agree to withdraw the BMD system from Poland at the summit. Washington did not say that removal is impossible, but instead delayed that discussion until at least September, when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will visit Moscow. A joint review of all of the world’s missile capabilities was established at the summit, and this joint review will consider Iranian — and North Korean — missiles. The Polish BMD system will be addressed in that context. In other words, Washington did not concede on the point, but it did not close off discussions. The Russians accordingly did not get what they wanted on the missiles at the summit; they got even less of what they wanted in the broader strategic sense of a neutralized Poland. The Russians in turn made no visible concessions on Iran. Apart from studying the Iranians’ missile systems, the Russians made no pledge to join in sanctions on Iran, nor did they join in any criticism of the current crackdown in Iran. The United States had once offered to trade Polish BMDs for Russian cooperation on Iran, an idea rejected by the Russians since the BMD system in Poland wasn’t worth the leverage Moscow has with Iran. Certainly without the Polish BMD withdrawal, there was going to be no movement on Iran. NATO expansion is where some U.S. concession might have emerged. In his speech on Tuesday, Obama said, “State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign policies. That is why this principle must apply to all nations – including Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security arrangement on another country. For either country to become a member of NATO, a majority of its people must choose to; they must undertake reforms; and they must be able to contribute to the alliance’s mission. And let me be clear: NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation.” On the surface, this reiterated the old U.S. position, which was that NATO expansion was between NATO and individual nations of the former Soviet Union, and did not — and should not — concern Moscow. The terms of expanding, reforming and contributing to NATO remained the same. But immediately after the Obama-Putin meeting, Russian sources began claiming that an understanding on NATO expansion was reached, and that the Americans conceded the point. We see some evidence for this in the speech — the U.S. public position almost never has included mention of public support or reforms. In many ways, however, this is splitting hairs. The French and Germans have long insisted that any NATO expansion should be limited to countries with strong public support for expansion, and which meet certain military thresholds that Georgia and Ukraine clearly do not meet (and could not meet even with a decade of hard work). Since NATO expansion requires unanimous support from all members, Russia was more interested in having the United States freeze its relations with other former Soviet states at their current level. Russian sources indicate that they did indeed get reassurances of such a freeze, but it takes an eager imagination to glean that from Obama’s public statement. Therefore, we come away with the sense that the summit changed little, but that it certainly didn’t cause any deterioration, which could have happened. Having a summit that causes no damage is an achievement in itself.

The Kennedy Trap

Perhaps the most important part of the summit was that Obama does not seem to have fallen into the Kennedy trap. Part of the lack of serious resolutions at the summit undoubtedly resulted from Obama’s unwillingness to be excessively accommodating to the Russians. With all of the comparisons to the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit being bruited about, Obama clearly had at least one overriding goal in Moscow: to not be weak. Obama tried to show his skills even before the summit, playing Medvedev and Putin against each other. No matter how obvious and clumsy that might have been, it served a public purpose by making it clear that Obama was not in awe of either of them. Creating processes rather than solutions also was part of that strategy. It appears, however, that the Russians did fall into the Kennedy trap a bit. The eagerness of Putin’s advisers to tout U.S. concession on Ukraine and Georgia after their meeting in spite of scant public evidence of such concessions gives us the sense that Putin wanted to show that he achieved something Medvedev couldn’t. There may well be a growing rivalry between Medvedev and Putin, and Obama might well have played off it. But that is for the gossip columns. The important news from the summit was as follows: First, no one screwed up, and second, U.S.-Russian relations did not get worse — and might actually have improved. No far-reaching strategic agreements were attained, but strategic improvements in the future were not excluded. Obama played his role without faltering, and there may be some smidgen of tension between the two personalities running Russia. As far as summits go, we have seen far worse and much better. But given the vitriol of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, routine is hardly a negative outcome. In the meantime, BMD remains under development in Poland, there is no U.S.-Russian agreement on Iran and, as far as we can confirm at present, no major shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine and Georgia has occurred. This summit will not be long remembered, but then Obama did not want the word “disastrous” attached to this summit as it had been to Kennedy’s first Soviet summit. We wish there were more exciting things to report about the summit, but sometimes there simply aren’t. And sometimes the routine might turn out significant, but we doubt that in this case. The geopolitical divide between the United States and Russia is as deep as ever, even if some of the sharper edges have been rounded. Ultimately, little progress was made in finding ways to bridge the two countries’ divergent interests. And the burning issues — particularly Poland and Iran — continue to burn.

Obama, first trip in Moscow

Russia, urged to do not interfere in the neighbouring states.


White House blog - Defining the Reset

Meeting the post-Cold War generation


Iran issue - stop the Iranian weapons vs. missile defense shield

Backroom Deals Can't Solve Transdniester Dispute

Vlad Spanu
RFE/RL
March 20

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met in Moscow this week with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and the head of the unrecognized breakaway region of Transdniester, Igor Smirnov. The final statement of the tripartite talks contains no legal commitments, but the meeting itself could have negative political implications for Moldova.

The joint statement praised the Russian-commanded peacekeeping troops -- the same forces that Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan told an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in December 2004 were stationed on Moldovan territory "against the political will of the Moldovan constitutional authorities in defiance of unanimously recognized international norms and principles."

The statement, however, does express a joint desire by the three leaders that the peacekeeping force be placed under a mandate from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Three Agendas

Each of the three men went into the March 18 meeting with his own agenda. Voronin, who wanted the meeting most, was eager for a photo-op with Medvedev, who is the second-most-popular politician in Moldova after Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, ahead of Moldova's April 5 parliamentary elections. Voronin's Communist Party counts heavily on the votes of ethnic Russians and on those of ethnic Moldovans whose jobs depend on Russia.

Medvedev, for his part, was seeking to rehabilitate Russia's reputation in the wake of August's war with Georgia, to show the world that Moscow can play a mediating role as a good neighbor. But in doing so, Russia has downplayed the 5+2 negotiating format (which includes the European Union, the United States, the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine, in addition to Moldova and Transdniester) and pushed Moldova toward direct talks with Tiraspol under the Kremlin's auspices.

As for Smirnov, he is always ready to participate in whatever meetings in whatever format Moscow dictates. He is a Russian citizen who was sent to Moldova in 1987 in order to foment and lead a separatist movement to counterbalance the nationalist movement that was emerging in Chisinau. And he accomplished this task brilliantly.

The separatist protest on the eastern side of the Nistru River culminated in an armed uprising that turned into a bloody conflict in the summer of 1992. Moldova's central leadership and armed forces were weak and soon yielded to Russian-backed troops and security forces. The Moldavian Trans-Nistrian Republic (MTR), also called Transnistria or Transdniester, was born.

Participant Or 'Guarantor'?

When a cease-fire agreement was signed on July 7, 1992, by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur, it seemed clear that Russia and Moldova were the two parties to this conflict. This interpretation was reinforced by a 2004 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights and by a 2006 study of the conflict by the New York City Bar Association titled "Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova."

Nevertheless, Moscow has insisted that its pawn, the Tiraspol government, not Russia, was a party to the conflict. As in the cases of Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia declared itself a "mediator" in Moldova, later elevating itself to the status of "guarantor of the peace." Russia has used all its available political and economic levers to compel Moldova to accept these terms.

Every time Moldova made concessions in the dispute, Russia consolidated its position. In 1994, Moldova accepted a Russian proposal on "synchronization" that would have made a Russian troop withdrawal contingent on a status agreement for the secessionist region. In 1997, the so-called Primakov memorandum (named after its promoter, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov) introduced the concept of a "common state," which was ultimately interpreted differently by all parties and led to no solutions.

The so-called Kyiv document of 2002, proposed by Moscow, stipulated the federalization of Moldova, a concept that was renewed in 2003 with the infamous Kozak memorandum (named for Dmitry Kozak, an aide to then Russian President Putin). That proposal was rejected by Voronin at the last minute under the pressure of street protests in Chisinau and on advice from the EU and the United States.


Moldova In 3-D


In 2004, nongovernmental Moldovan experts, working with Western analysts, offered an alternative plan for a federated Moldova. Called the "3-D strategy" (decriminalization, demilitarization, and democratization), this document has gained broad support in Moldova.

The plan called for strengthening the then-existing five-party negotiating format (Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, plus Moldova and Transdniester) with a 3+1+3 format (Russia, Ukraine, and Romania plus Molodova plus the EU, the United States, and the OSCE), thereby including the West and excluding Transdniester.

It also called for a border-monitoring mission along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, a supervising authority, and an international civil provisional administration that would implement postconflict recovery plans.

The 3-D strategy was used by the Moldovan parliament to formulate three resolutions on the conflict that were adopted in June 2005 and the law on the basic principles of the special status of the localities on the eastern bank of the Nistru, which was adopted in July 2005. That year, Ukraine became actively involved in the negotiating process, putting forward its own plans and initiatives.

These, however, largely focused on democratization (through elections in Transdniester), which was counterproductive since the processes of decriminalization and demilitarization were stalled. As a result, any elections held could hardly be considered democratic.

Since 2005, both the United States and the EU have also stepped up their involvement, notably with the opening of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in December 2005.


Western Interest

Russia reluctantly accepted the West at the negotiating table, a reluctance driven by Moscow's view that the former Soviet republics form a special sphere of interest for Russia. Moscow also was unwilling to concede that after Romania joined NATO and the EU, Moldova had more in common with the West than with Russia, with which it does not have a common border.

When Moldova and Ukraine began implementing customs regulations in accordance with international norms in 2006, Russia responded by applying economic sanctions against Moldova. Moscow imposed an embargo on the importation of Moldovan wines and agricultural goods, an action that not only harmed Moldova, but also was a setback for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).

No matter what government takes power after the April 5 elections in Moldova or who the new parliament selects as president, Moldova clearly needs to, as they say these days, push the reset button in relations with Russia.

Chisinau will have to stick solidly to the principles of international norms and agreements and push for Moscow to fulfill the commitments it has made within the framework of international organizations. It must reject a negotiating format that has no transparency for Moldova's Western partners.

The meeting in Moscow yesterday was a mistake -- it was wrong for Moldova to leave the room where its friends and neighbors were seated in order to deal with Russia behind the scenes. And most importantly, the 3-D strategy must remain Moldova's overarching framework for resolving the Transdniester dispute.

Vlad Spanu is the president of the Moldova Foundation in Washington. He served as a senior Moldovan diplomat between 1992 and 2001 and co-authored, with Andrei Brezianu, "The Historical Dictionary of Moldova." The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

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Reversing habit of 'legal nihilism'

Ariel Cohen
Washington Times
April 1

President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will meet Wednesday on the sidelines at the Group of 20 summit. Ironically, that's one day after the trial of former Russian oilman Mikhail Khodorkovsky opens in Moscow. This trial symbolizes the deterioration of the rule of law in Russia.

While the two leaders - both former law professors - will have their hands full with economic and security matters, the rule of law also should figure prominently on their bilateral agenda. A healthy legal system is necessary to protect the rights of foreign and domestic investors and to facilitate the development of civil society and human rights.

Russia's track record under communism was abysmal, and even before that it was problematic. Under Mr. Medvedev, who is attempting to turn the fight against corruption into a personal crusade, there may be changes for the better.

During the Boris Yeltsin presidency, the Russian courts, despite their corrupt practices and lack of judicial sophistication, slowly inched toward more independence. In 2002-03, however, a reversal began. The rulers increasingly use “telephone justice” - senior state officials call upon judges and tell them how to decide cases under the guise of protecting “paramount state interests.”

The “siloviki” - bosses of security services - increasingly have been involved in hostile takeovers, including of intellectual property such as lucrative trademarks like Stoli vodka. Most of all, they have been going after oil, metals and minerals.

The 2003-05 Yukos case was a watershed. The most successful and transparent Russian oil company was taken over under the pretext of multibillion-ruble tax arrears. Yet many government officials clearly stated that its owner, Mr. Khodorkovsky, was perceived as a political threat because of his support of liberal political parties and civil society.

The persecution of Yukos undermined the notion of justice being universal because it selectively targeted a politically inconvenient opponent. Loyal Russian oligarchs - though involved in unsavory business practices - were not prosecuted. The oligarchs and politicians quickly got the message that, in the words of the Borg in “Star Trek,” “Resistance is futile.”

After the Yukos affair, Russian and Western oil companies came under tremendous pressure from the Russian government, which used the state bureaucracy to renegotiate earlier contracts or to boot competitors out of the country. The victims included Exxon, Shell, British Petroleum, Hermitage Capital and the Russian companies Rusneft and Mechel.

Mr. Khodorkovsky was sentenced in 2005 and was eligible for parole last year. Instead, on Tuesday, he and his partner Platon Lebedev will face a new trial - and a new rap sheet. The trial is widely believed to be a political vendetta.

This may be a chance for Mr. Medvedev, who spoke with concern about Russia's “legal nihilism,” to act. As the kangaroo court gets under way, some Russian experts hope Mr. Medvedev may order an impartial trial or pardon Mr. Khodorkovsky. If, however, the West fails to save Mr. Khodorkovsky and Mr. Lebedev from life sentences, it would also surrender the chance for a more law-abiding state to the “siloviki” power brokers.

At the summit, Mr. Obama also should bring up the October 2006 murder of crusading journalist Anna Politkovskaya, whose likely killers were acquitted by a Moscow jury in February. The prosecutors never even presented the court the names of those suspected of ordering her murder or the suspected gunman.

The police also haven't made arrests in the murder of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov, who was gunned down a stone's throw from the Kremlin along with journalist Anastasia Baburova in February. The murders of others, including the defenestration of Kommersant Daily's military correspondent Ivan Safronov, the poisoning of Novaya Gazeta's deputy editor Yuri Shchekochikhin and the fatal 2004 shooting of Paul Klebnikov, an American of Russian descent who was editor in chief of Russian Forbes, all remain unresolved.

Without fundamental legal reform, a fight against corruption and a return to judicial independence, Russia will continue to linger at the bottom of the Transparency International Corruption Index and the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. If Russia doesn't return to internationally recognized legal practices, investments are likely to slow, and capital will continue to flee.

The administration should appeal to Mr. Medvedev to stop what he himself has called law enforcement's “nightmarish practices,” start reforming the legal system, ban the secret police and law enforcement bosses from engaging in expropriations and extortion, and fight corruption.

Mr. Obama also should ask that Mr. Medvedev order renewed investigations of the Politkovskaya and Markelov cases and ask for the release of Mr. Khodorkovsky. These measures would be a strong signal to the United States, to the Western business community and to the Russian people that a clean break with the lawless past is under way and that Russia may be joining the community of civilized nations.

Ariel Cohen is senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation.

Mini-incident marks EU-Russia meeting

Philippa Runner

February 6

EU Observer

An EU-Russia meeting designed to improve post-gas crisis ties went wrong on Friday (6 January), when European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso clashed with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin over human rights. A visibly angry Mr Putin during a press conference in Moscow censured the commission chief for having discussed "legal matters" with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in a bilateral meeting in his absence earlier the same day.

"We need to discuss the full range of problems - both in Russia and in Europe - in order to be able to solve them," Mr Putin said, accusing EU states of themselves mistreating Russian ethnic minorities, prisoners and migrants."In [EU] public opinion there is some concern regarding some recent events that happened in Russia. Namely, the murder of some journalists and some rights activists," Mr Barroso replied in bullish tones. "Human rights and rule of law are much more important than diplomacy between two states."
The unusual exchange comes after the recent slaying, in broad daylight in the Russian capital, of lawyer Stanislav Markelov and reporter Anastasiya Baburova, who investigated state killings and torture in North Caucasus. Mr Barroso had flown over with nine commissioners to meet with the Russian government in the first such high-profile event since 200The diplomatic mission came in the wake of the January gas crisis, which also saw the commission chief use strong language, at one point saying Russian and Ukrainian leaders were less trustworthy than some African statesRussia's invasion and partition of EU ally Georgia last August had already complicated relations. But the then French EU presidency tried to restore business as usual amid fears that a rupture could hurt EU trade and geopolitical interests.Mr Putin on Friday also said that EU monitors overlooking Russian gas flows via Ukraine should stay in place "until the end of the first quarter 2009."The team, made up mostly of delegates from EU energy firms, arrived in Russia on 10 January and was originally asked to leave by both Moscow and Kiev after gas flows restarted on 19 January.A lower-level EU delegation including external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner also visited Kiev earlier this week, urging political stability and faster reforms.The timing of the visit proved unfortunate. The same day, a punch-up broke out in the country's parliament during a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, forcing the iron lady to scurry for shelter among her party's deputies.

New contexts, old mentalities. During the Cold War, the communist countries leader praised their wonderful life standards with pictures from the "Wild West". One of their favorite topics was the homeless Americans. The former Russian president is accusing the EU states now of neglecting the minorities and immigrants. What about the constant attacks against foreigners in big Russian cities?

Opposition says Russia's main economic problem is Putin

James Kilner

Reuters

Russian opposition leaders accused Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Friday of wasting billions of dollars in public funds and said he was Russia's main obstacle to coping with the global financial crisis.

At a news briefing largely ignored by state media, two former deputy ministers and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov said the government had lied about the country's economic problems and laid out their alternative strategy.

"To begin with we need the resignation of Vladimir Putin's government which in this crisis has already demonstrated its complete helplessness and ridiculous incompetence," the opposition movement Solidarity said in a statement.

Solidarity, an umbrella movement supported by anti-government liberals, includes former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov, former deputy energy minister Vladimir Milov and Kasparov, who hosted the briefing.

Last weekend Russia's opposition held a series of anti-government marches across Russia, which attracted a few thousand people -- mainly old communists and young radicals.

But the opposition expects a weakening economy to generate more support and undermine the government.

Since last summer Russia's stock market has dived by 80 percent, the rouble has dropped by around 35 percent and reserves have shrunk by 40 percent to about $385 billion (260.8 billion pound) due to currency support and the low price of oil.

"This is wrong," said Milov. "We don't want to waste the money on defending the rouble which will devalue anyway. We want to give the money directly to the people to compensate for the negative consequences of rouble depreciation."

The financial downturn has halted a decade-long, commodity-driven economic boom in Russia.

But the boom also created a huge wealth divide. Most Russians earn only a few hundred dollars a month and the opposition said they wanted to direct the oil wealth to the poorest Russians -- a section of society they need to woo.

"We want to use the reserves to help with the social consequences and not burn them at this stage (on the defence of the rouble)," Milov said.

Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev remain popular in Russia despite the economic downturn, while support for opposition groups is low.

But Kasparov said it was just a matter of time until support for anti-government opposition gathered momentum.

"We debate among ourselves when the support will come, but there is no doubt it will happen," he said.

Busy time in Moscow

For the moment, Russia decided to end the gas crisis. Meanwhile, Russia's ruble falls to a six year low, threatening to deepen the country's economic crisis. Even, for sure, the president in Kremlin had a very full agenda, Dmitri Medvedev found some time to post opinions on his blog about the need to revitalize the sports in his country and allowed, for the first time in months, the posting of comments from the readers.