Strong condemnation of the Iranian regime by Nicolas Sarkozy
The opposition calls the release of detainees
Showing posts with label civil rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil rights. Show all posts
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Monday, June 22, 2009
The Iranian Elections and the Revolution Test
George Friedman
June 22
Successful revolutions have three phases. First, a strategically located single or limited segment of society begins vocally to express resentment, asserting itself in the streets of a major city, usually the capital. This segment is joined by other segments in the city and by segments elsewhere as the demonstration spreads to other cities and becomes more assertive, disruptive and potentially violent. As resistance to the regime spreads, the regime deploys its military and security forces. These forces, drawn from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn on the regime, and stop following the regime’s orders. This is what happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia in 1917 or in Romania in 1989.
Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated. When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces — who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the demonstrators — and use force to suppress the rising to the extent necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The students who rose up were not joined by others. Military forces who were not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, and the students were crushed.
Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated. When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces — who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the demonstrators — and use force to suppress the rising to the extent necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The students who rose up were not joined by others. Military forces who were not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, and the students were crushed.
A Question of Support
This is also what happened in Iran this week. The global media, obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators — who were supporters of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s opponents — failed to notice that while large, the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of people demonstrating. Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other classes and to other areas. In constantly interviewing English-speaking demonstrators, they failed to note just how many of the demonstrators spoke English and had smartphones. The media thus did not recognize these as the signs of a failing revolution.
Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops — definitely not drawn from what we might call the “Twittering classes,” would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 — it was Tiananmen Square.
In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized. This is an important point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators representative of the country. The problem is the Iranian definition of urban — and this is quite common around the world — includes very small communities (some with only a few thousand people) as “urban.” But the social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York. We can assure you that that difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same way. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led observers to assume that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country.
Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to about 13 million people out of Iran’s total population of 70.5 million. Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities. There are six cities with populations between 1 million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000. Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than 1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000. Iran has 80 cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than 100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with 100,000 and 5 million are tenuous. And with metro Oklahoma City having more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many faces.
Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops — definitely not drawn from what we might call the “Twittering classes,” would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 — it was Tiananmen Square.
In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized. This is an important point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators representative of the country. The problem is the Iranian definition of urban — and this is quite common around the world — includes very small communities (some with only a few thousand people) as “urban.” But the social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York. We can assure you that that difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same way. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society led observers to assume that students at Iran’s elite university somehow spoke for the rest of the country.
Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to about 13 million people out of Iran’s total population of 70.5 million. Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at elite universities. There are six cities with populations between 1 million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000. Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than 1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000. Iran has 80 cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than 100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with 100,000 and 5 million are tenuous. And with metro Oklahoma City having more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many faces.
Winning the Election With or Without Fraud
We continue to believe two things: that vote fraud occurred, and that Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. Very little direct evidence has emerged to establish vote fraud, but several things seem suspect.
For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. The polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line. By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission declared Ahmadinejad the winner. The vote count thus took about seven hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members or school board members being counted — just the presidential race.) Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time in their allegations.
The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else. The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same time in all regions, we would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other out — explaining why voting percentages didn’t change much during the night.
It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn’t even carry their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn’t carry Tennessee in 2000. We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn’t carry his home precinct in part because people didn’t want to spend their vote on someone unlikely to win — an effect probably felt by the two smaller candidates in the Iranian election.
That Mousavi didn’t carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, but by no means was a smoking gun.
We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, 99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly secular area home to the shah’s family. Ahmadinejad carried the province by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years ago. But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them together, it would not have changed the outcome. The fact is that Ahmadinejad’s vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage in 2005. And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad’s performance in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat, many Iranians who viewed those debates — including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters — acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.
Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet to be rebutted. But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him. Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn’t, they assumed they were robbed and took to the streets.
But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. In a complete hijacking of the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi’s supporters joined by others who had been disenfranchised. On last Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of Mousavi voters should have made their appearance. They didn’t. We might assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage. While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small fraction of society.
For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. The polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line. By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission declared Ahmadinejad the winner. The vote count thus took about seven hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members or school board members being counted — just the presidential race.) Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time in their allegations.
The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus 14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else. The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same time in all regions, we would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other out — explaining why voting percentages didn’t change much during the night.
It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn’t even carry their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn’t carry Tennessee in 2000. We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn’t carry his home precinct in part because people didn’t want to spend their vote on someone unlikely to win — an effect probably felt by the two smaller candidates in the Iranian election.
That Mousavi didn’t carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, but by no means was a smoking gun.
We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, 99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly secular area home to the shah’s family. Ahmadinejad carried the province by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years ago. But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them together, it would not have changed the outcome. The fact is that Ahmadinejad’s vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage in 2005. And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad’s performance in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat, many Iranians who viewed those debates — including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters — acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.
Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet to be rebutted. But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him. Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn’t, they assumed they were robbed and took to the streets.
But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. In a complete hijacking of the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi’s supporters joined by others who had been disenfranchised. On last Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of Mousavi voters should have made their appearance. They didn’t. We might assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage. While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small fraction of society.
Tensions Among the Political Elite
All of this not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there isn’t a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues.
The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.
The Western media misunderstood this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them , that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason Western media missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply didn’t understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.
Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.
Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight — but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle.
The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.
The Western media misunderstood this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them , that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason Western media missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply didn’t understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.
Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.
Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight — but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle.
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Sunday, June 14, 2009
What's next in Iran
A force that nobody could stay against - the youngsters' movement
Street protests under the permanent danger of repression
EU's position
A view and reports from the Jerusalem Post
Street protests under the permanent danger of repression
EU's position
A view and reports from the Jerusalem Post
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Violent anti-communist protests after election in Moldova
(Gleb Garanich/Reuters)
Demonstrators hurl stones at police during the protest in Chisinau. At least 30 people were hurt
The tiny republic of Moldova erupted in violence today as anti-communist demonstrators stormed the parliament in protest at what they said were rigged elections.
Angry crowds smashed windows and threw furniture and computers from the building after overwhelming riot police in the capital Chisinau. Up to 20,000 people were said to be on the streets, many chanting "Freedom, freedom" and "Down with the communists".
At least 30 protesters and police were reported hurt in clashes. Police fired tear gas and water cannon to try to regain control as the demonstrators, many of them students, lit fires and attacked a nearby presidential administration building.
The violence came after the Communists won some 50 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in the former Soviet republic, where they have been in power since 2001. Under Moldova's constitution, parliament will elect a new president to succeed the Communist leader Vladimir Voronin, who is due to step down after serving the maximum two terms.
Moldova is Europe's only communist state and one of its poorest, with an average monthly salary of only $350. Thousands of its people seek work abroad to support their families, sending back $1.6 billion in remittances last year - about the same amount as the state budget.
International observers had judged the election to be fair but the Mayor of Chisinau, Dorin Chirtoaca, alleged that turnout had been inflated to cover up ballot fraud and multiple voting. Mr Chirtoaca is also deputy leader of the opposition Liberal Party.
Moldova's three main opposition parties demanded fresh elections to defuse tensions as protesters burnt communist flags and chanted "We want to join Europe" and "We are Romanians". Many were waving Romanian and European Union flags.
Two-thirds of Moldova's 3.8 million people are descended from Romanians and retain strong ties with their neighbour in the EU. The former Bessarabia was part of Romania until Josef Stalin annexed it for the Soviet Union under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Hitler's Germany in World War Two.
The EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana called on all sides to "refrain from violence and provocation" amid fears of instability on the union's eastern border. Moldova is scheduled to join the EU's new Eastern Partnership aid programme next month with five other former Soviet republics.
Russia's deputy foreign minister, Grigory Karasin, expressed concern at the violence, which he said had been provoked. He noted that observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and from former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States had declared the election result to be fair.
The protest began yesterday with demonstrations organised by a protest group called I Am An Anti-Communist. Organisers said that they did not believe one in two Moldovans had voted for the Communists.
"The protests are justified because people did not vote for the Communists in such large numbers," Mr Chirtoaca told local television. "The elections were fraudulent, there was multiple voting...These are people who don't know what democracy is."
The only foreign leader to congratulate Moldova after Sunday's poll was Russia's President Dmitri Medvedev. He has recently sought to mediate a settlement to the "frozen conflict" between Moldova and its Russian-dominated region of Transdniestr, which declared independence in 1990.
Hundreds died in fighting between the two sides until Russian peacekeepers intervened. Transdniestr voted in a referendum in 2006 to seek to join Russia, but the international community refused to recognise the decision.
Moldova's Communist Party was strongly pro-Russian until 2005, when it abruptedly adopted a pro-European policy amid local anger at negotiations over Transdniestr that many feared would hand too much power to Moscow.
The party ran on a pledge to build a "European Moldova" in the elections, although the country remains heavily dependent on Russia for supplies of gas and other materials.
In a way, it is a similar scenario, played before in Serbia-Montenegro in the time of Milosevic, in Kucima's Ukraine, in Shevarnadze's Georgia. In all these cases you had suspicions over the organisation of the electoral process. Also, you had the same ruling parties with strong ties to organized crime and corruption, under the cover of (neo)communism. These "revolutions" made history. Part of history is as well the lack of proper elites and individuals prepared to take seriously the public duties. What will happened in the Republic of Moldova - is unknown, dued also to the trouble situation from Transdniestr. The lesson of Georgia from the last year should be revisited.
Moldova's Twitter Revolution
Evgeny Morosov
April 7
Cellphones and text messaging are widely believed to have played a crucial role in fostering the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (or at least, making the protests as widespread and successful as they were); the Berkman Center at Harvard published probably the most comprehensive study of the role that social media played in the Orange Revolution (even though I criticized some of its cyber-utopian assumptions in a recent essay for Boston Review).
Could it be that five years after the famous protests in Kiev's Maidan Square another technology - Twitter - will usher in another revolution in neighbouring Moldova? Will we remember the events that are now unfolding in Chisinau not by the color of the flags but by the social-networking technology used?
If you asked me about the prospects of a Twitter-driven revolution in a low-tech country like Moldova a week ago, my answer would probably be a qualified "no". Today, however, I am no longer as certain. If you bothered to check the most popular discussions on Twitter in the last 48 hours, you may have stumbled upon a weird threat of posts marked with a tag "#pman" (it's currently listed in Twitter's "Trending Topics" along with "Apple Store", Eminem, and Easter).
No, "pman" is not short for "pacman"; it stands for "Piata Marii Adunari Nationale", which is Romanian name for the biggest square in Chisinau, Moldova's capital. This is not the first time that a Twitter "tag" has been used to mobilize young people around a particular event; the most famous previous case has been that of "griots" - the tag used to report on the youth riogs in Greece, which later spread to Europe, arguably also with the help of Twitter (chech these two pieces I wrote on the subject of "networked protest" - one for The Economist and one for openDemocracy).
Ever since yesterday's announcement that Moldova's communists have won enough votes to form a government in Sunday's elections, Moldova's progressive youth took to the streets in angry protests. As behooves any political protest by young people today, they also turned to Facebook and Twitter to raise awareness about the planned protests and flashmobs. Led by youth NGOs like HydePark and ThinkMoldova, the protests began very peacefully - as a flashmob, where young people were simply supposed to hold lit candles in the vicinity of the square.
However, this morning things got out of hand - and, with or without Twitter's help, the crowd got much larger, reaching as many as 10,000 people, who first picketed Election Commission headquarters, the president’s residence (windows are reported to be broken - and there are also reports that this building has been stormed), and other government buildings before storming the building of the Moldovan Parliament, which happens to be just across the road.
Technology is playing an important role in facilitating these protests. In addition to huge mobilization eforts both on Twitter and Facebook, Moldova's angry youth - especially those who are currently abroad (roughly a quarter of Moldova's population are working abroad due to dire economic conditions back at home) - could follow the events on this livestream provided by a Romanian TV station - directly from the square.
I've just spoken to a Moldovan friend who is himself a big technology fan; according to him, there is little to none cellphone coverage in the square itself (turning off cellphone coverage in protest areas is a trick that was also used by the Belarusian authorities to diffuse 2006 protests in Minsk's central square), so protesters have to leave it to post updates to Twitter via GPRS technology on their mobiles.
The related posts on Twitter are being posted at a record-breaking rate - I've been watching the Twitter stream for the last 20 minutes - and I see almost 200 new Twitter messages marked with "pman" (virtually all of them in Romanian, with only one or two in English). In the last few hours there have also emerged several "smart" aggregators of posts on the subject, like this one - they have to contextualize what exactly is happening -- and this one for YouTube videos. Many blog posts are also being updated in real-time - minute by minute - check this one. There are also a plenty of videos on YouTube and photos, including those uploaded to Facebook.
There are also a few moving English-language Twitter posts like this - "in #pman a grenade thrown by the police has torn apart one of the protester's leg"- that would surely be perused by foreign journalists. It's hard to predict for how long this cornucopia of user-generated media would continue; my Moldovan contacts report that the authorities may have required some Moldovan ISPs to restrict Internet connection with the outside world, so the protesters might soon face difficulties in getting their reports out.
All in all, while it's probably too early to tell whether Moldova's Twitter revolution will be successful, it would certainly be wrong to disregard the role that Twitter and other social media have played in mobilize (and, even more so, reporting on) the protests. Of course, it helps that young Moldovans are sick and tired of the communist government (for a long time the only one in Europe) and there may be a few reasons to be concerned about voting irregularities but, overall, the Chisinau protests undoubtedly present an interesting case-study that I hope academic institutions like Harvard's Berkman Center and others would take on and examine in detail.
Photo: VADIM DENISOV/AFP/Getty Images
16.10 - The Internet was cut in Kishinew. The sites of the news agencies and othr media tools were not available two hours later.
See also:
Jamestown Foundation on the prospects of Moldova-Balkans pipelineEU Presidency Statement on the developments in the Republic of Moldova
The Presidency expresses its serious concern at the developments in the Republic of Moldova, following the 5 April parliamentary elections.
The Presidency wishes to recall that the International Election Observation Mission noted in its preliminary findings that the elections met many international standards and commitments, but that further improvements were required to ensure an electoral process free from undue administrative interference, and to increase public confidence.
The Presidency condemns the use of violence and calls for restraint on all sides. It is crucial to respect the freedom of peaceful assembly.
Facts about ex-Soviet Republic of Moldova
They made the demand after students protesting over Sunday's election victory by the ruling Communists broke into Moldova's Parliament building on Tuesday and hurled chairs, tables and papers into the street before setting them ablaze.
Following are facts about the country.
* Moldova is a former Soviet republic that declared independence on August 27, 1991.
* It has a population of about 4.5 million sandwiched between Ukraine and European Union member Romania, with whom it shares linguistic and historic heritage.
* Moldova's ruling Communists won a parliamentary election on Sunday. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe said the poll met many international standards, but several thousand people, mainly students and youths, took to the streets to protest against what they said were Communist violations. Some broke into the parliament building on Tuesday.
* President Vladimir Voronin is the only Communist leader in Europe and the former Soviet Union. In office since 2001, he has said he wants to stay close to power. He cannot serve a third consecutive term.
* Transdniestria, a sliver of land in the east and populated by mainly Russian speakers, broke away in 1990 and the two sides fought a brief war in 1992 after Moldova gained independence. Transdniestria, home to much of the country's industry, demands independence. Moldova is willing only to give it autonomy.
* Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. Its economy is driven by agricultural production -- its wines are famous in the region.
* Moldova is part of the EU's Eastern Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy initiatives, but not a member of the NATO military alliance. It relies heavily on Russia for its energy resources.
An eye on Belarus:
EU Czech presidency: “Situation in Belarus hasn’t considerably changed”
charter97.com
April 7
The Czech Republic, holding the EU presidency, says the decision on inviting Alyaksandr Lukashenka to the Eastern Partnership summit will be made at the very last moment.
On April 6, Czech deputy prime minister for European affairs Alexandr Vondra said “it is important to motivate Minsk to positive steps,” Agence France-Presse reports.
“This European policy has so far produced partial results. However, we are far from saying that the situation has considerably improved," the Czech official said.
Alexandr Vondra stressed that none of the six countries is yet prepared for EU membership and that the program should "bridge the period" till membership begins.
The Czech Republic also confirmed the summit would be held in Prague on May 7. Earlier it was said that the summit might have been held in Brussels. The Eastern Partnership program is one of the primary aims of the Czech presidency, expiring on June 30.
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are offered closer political ties and economic integration in the frames of the new project. It doesn’t suppose membership in the European Union but offers participation in bilateral and multilateral projects.
The EU foreign ministers confirmed in March a decision on nine-month visa ban reprieve for Belarusian high ranking officials, including Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who were banned to entry Europe.
In October 2008, the EU Council of Ministers decided to suspend visa bans for Belarusian officials, imposed in 2006 in response to Belarus’s actions against the opposition. The sanctions affected Lukashenka and 41 Belarusian officials.
Sanctions against the officials, suspected by the international community of killings of opposition leaders and a journalist, namely former interior minister Uladzimir Navumau, former secretary of the Security Council Viktar Sheiman, commander of special task squad of the internal troops Dzmitry Paulichenka, and former interior minister Yury Sivakou still remain in force. Lidziya Yarmoshyna, head of the Central Election Commission, is also banned to entry the EU for rigging the election results in Belarus.
UPDATES from Kishinew
17.00 The representatives of the opposition from Kishinew are negotiating with the prime minister Zinaida Greceanu and the leaders of the Communist Party the possibility to organize new elections. The discussions are taking place in the presence of the EU and US ambassadors in the Republic of Moldova.
This round ended at 18.10 without any clear results. The Communist Party accused Romania of implication in a plot aiming to topple the current leadership.
- In the speech held two hours earlier than scheduled, Vladimir Voronin talked about a "very well planned operation" and that "they" want a" bloodshed".
- In a declaration for the Russian agency Interfax, Aleksei Ostrovski, the chief of the State Duma Commission for relationships with the CIS, referred to implications of European intelligence services and certain forces from Romania.
- The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs outlined it is following the position of the EU regarding the last evolutions in Kishinew.
In the afternoon, in 10 big towns from Romania, including the capital-city Bucharest they were organized several public gatherings of solidarity with the opposition in the Republic of Moldova.
Wednesday, December 17, 2008
Bangladesh, between the military rule and the return to democracy
December 29, in Bangladesh they will be hold elections, after almost two years of military rule. The retirement of the Army back into the barracks is depending also of the capacity of the politicians to fully assume their duties. A Reuters analysis of the present and possible post-electoral evolutions, here.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)