Low seats

I must recognize that I needed to read at least twice this "story" of the low seats diplomatic incident between Israel and Turkey, from the first half of January.

For me, it sounded as a very soap opera fake of the 1001 Nights from the ante chambers of the Ottoman Empire. It is clear this kind of "creativity" do not have nothing to do with diplomacy and I am still processing the practical reasons for taking such a...non sensical setting. What it is for me very curious as well is that the Turkish ambassador accepted to be the actor of this doubtful taste scenario.

We could suppose that he saw the disposition - and the height, of course - of the chairs in the room. But he not only stayed there, but also accepted to be filmed in the front of the camera. Not a single word said directly. It was not a normal situation so it is ridiculous to think about the need to wait for special instructions from Ankara. But, nothing "creative" from this part, by far. And accepted the further victimization. Strange and unknown diplomatic roads. But not excuse, of course, for the mise-en-scene.

First step for South Stream

FT - No friends, only partners in Realpolitik
Bloomberg - Turkey's offer to Gazprom

Turkey's decision could be a tough answer to the EU following the difficult European negotiations.

Factbox about Nabucco

Hungarian support for Nabucco

In the same time, I will doubt at least 10% the ways in which public opinion understand the technical and economic feasability arguments for a pipeline or another, otherwise than by political and national sympathies.

Where is to find Bulgaria, a traditional ally of Russia?

Turkey's Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

Saban Kardas
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 62
Jamestown Foundation

April 1

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan casts a vote in the recent elections (Photo: DPA)

The mixed results of the Turkish local elections on March 29 raised questions over the future direction of the governing Justice and Development Party's (AKP) policies (EDM, March 31). The government is unlikely to call a snap election, but the relative decline in the AKP's share of the vote will have significant implications for Turkey's political landscape, compelling more recognition of public opinion and limiting the scope for assertive domestic and foreign policies.

Turkey's local elections directly affect national politics, and have been traditionally considered as a de facto vote of confidence for the incumbent government. Moreover, prior to the March 29 elections, the AKP pursued an aggressive campaign, which effectively turned the local elections into a national referendum on its policies (EDM, December 3). Now, having fallen below the thresholds it set for itself, the AKP is seeking to redefine its priorities in Turkish politics.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan convened meetings with his cabinet ministers and party members to assess the causes of the decline, while considering a cabinet reshuffle and other changes within the party (Star, March 31). Beyond these short term changes, the elections are likely to have an enduring resonance on the AKP's domestic and foreign policies. Though it remains to be seen what path it will choose, there appears to be two alternatives: either the AKP will follow a reformist line and initiate major change, or it will prefer prudence and avoid proactive policies.

The AKP's core supporters, conservative center-right voters and liberals, expect the government to abandon its complacency, and resume domestic reforms. The EU and western observers also share similar views. They believe that the AKP owes its past electoral success to the pro-democratization agenda, which it adopted at the outset. For them, the AKP's recovery depends on its ability to revive its former reformist image. If the AKP chooses this alternative, it will have to refocus on constitutional changes, and intensify the EU membership process in order to satisfy the reformists' demands (Sabah, March 30).

Reformists also want the AKP to pursue a more proactive foreign policy. Many observers had argued that following the local elections, the government would press ahead with ambitious foreign policy initiatives, including normalizing its relations with Armenia. EU officials have suggested Turkey might take further steps in this process, such as opening the border with Armenia following President Barack Obama's visit to Turkey on April 6-7 (Hurriyet, March 30).

It is unclear whether the AKP can fufil these expectations. The AKP was founded as a party representing diverse interests, and, since its establishment, Erdogan's charismatic leadership has united the various factions within the party. The sense of over-confidence imbued by successive election victories and the presence of a strong leader, led the AKP to develop a top-down approach to politics. The party's largely unchallenged dominance enabled it to conduct domestic and foreign policies in an unrestricted manner.

The new voting patterns, however, are a stark reminder to the AKP that the Turkish electorate is sensitive to the implications of the government's policies, and may withdraw their support when necessary. The pre-occupation with re-election in the next national elections, slated for 2011, will be the AKP's main concern. Equally, it will tread a fine line between satisfying the demands of its core constituencies and responding to the challenges posed by the opposition. Since the AKP cannot take its popular support for granted, it might be more circumspect in its domestic and foreign policies. These pressures, in turn, might curb the AKP's activism, and force it to adopt more conformist policies.

The government will need to form broad based coalitions with opposition parties in order to implement its domestic reforms. However, having gained ground on the AKP, major opposition parties such as the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have little incentive to cooperate with the government. Moreover, Erdogan's antagonistic attitude during the election campaign will complicate building coalitions with his rivals, who have already announced their opposition to his position on constitutional amendments (EDM, March 4). Against this background, relations between the government and the opposition are likely to remain tense, and it is questionable whether the AKP can deliver radical democratization reforms (Radikal, March 30).

The AKP's leftist, nationalist, secularist and Islamist opponents are united in their objection to its foreign policy. They view the AKP's policies as a "betrayal of Turkey's national interests," and they are critical of the AKP's policy of rapprochement with Armenia. Previously, the AKP largely ignored any negative public reaction and the opposition, in its efforts to normalize relations with Yerevan. However, now that the AKP is more vulnerable to public scrutiny, faced with pressure from a stronger opposition, it may adopt a cautious approach and avoid foreign policy risks. Therefore, although normalizing relations with Armenia will continue, it may be premature to expect radical steps, such as opening the border or establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia (ANKA, March 30).

Erdogan's Outburst and the Future of the Turkish State

George Friedman
February 2
Stratfor.com



Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan exploded during a public discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last week. Erdogan did not blow up at Peres, but rather at the moderator, Washington Post columnist and associate editor David Ignatius, whom Erdogan accused of giving more time to Peres. Afterward, Erdogan said, “I did not target at all in any way the Israeli people, President Peres or the Jewish people. I am a prime minister, a leader who has expressly stated that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity.”

Nevertheless, the international press focused not on the finer points of Erdogan’s reasoning, but rather on his attacks on Israeli policy in Gaza and his angry exit, which many thought were directed at Peres and Israel. The confusion, we suspect, suited Erdogan quite well. Turkey is effectively an ally of Israel. Given this alliance, the recent events in Gaza put Erdogan in a difficult position. The Turkish prime minister needed to show his opposition to Israel’s policies to his followers in Turkey’s moderate Islamist community without alarming Turkey’s military that he was moving to rupture relations with Israel. Whether calculated or not, Erdogan’s explosion in Davos allowed him to appear to demonstrate vocal opposition to Israel — directly to Israel’s president, no le ss — without actually threatening ties with Israel.

It is important to understand the complexity of Erdogan’s political position. Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Turkey has had a secular government. The secularism of the government was guaranteed constitutionally by the military, whose role it was to protect the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk — the founder of modern, secular Turkey, who used the army as an instrument of nation-building. The Turkish public, in contrast, runs the gamut from ultrasecularists to radical Islamists.

Erdogan is an elected moderate Islamist. As such, he is held in suspicion by the army and severely circumscribed in how far he can go on religious matters. To his right politically are more hard-line Islamist parties, which are making inroads into Turkish public opinion. Erdogan must balance between these forces, avoiding the two extreme outcomes of military intervention and Islamist terrorism.

Meanwhile, from a geopolitical perspective, Turkey is always in an uncomfortable place. Asia Minor is the pivot of Eurasia. It is the land bridge between Asia and Europe, the northern frontier of the Arab world and the southern frontier of the Caucasus. Its influence spreads outward toward the Balkans, Russia, Central Asia, the Arab world and Iran. Alternatively, Turkey is the target of forces emanating from all of these directions. Add to this its control of the Bosporus, which makes Turkey the interface between the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and the complexity of Turkey’s position becomes clear: Turkey is always either under pressure from its neighbors or pressuring its neighbors. It is perpetually be ing drawn outward in multiple directions, even into the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey has two different paths for dealing with its geopolitical challenge.


Secular Isolationism


From the army’s point of view, the Ottoman Empire was a disaster that entangled Turkey into the catastrophe of Word War I. One of Ataturk’s solutions involved not only contracting Turkey after the war, but containing it in such a way that it could not be drawn into the extreme risk of imperial adventure.

In World War II, both Axis and Allies wooed and subverted Turkey. But the country managed — with difficulty — to maintain neutrality, thereby avoiding another national catastrophe.

During the Cold War, Turkey’s position was equally difficult. Facing Soviet pressure from the north, the Turks had to ally themselves with the United States and NATO. Turkey possessed something the Soviets desperately wanted: the Bosporus, which would have given the Soviet navy unimpeded access to the Mediterranean. Naturally, the Turks could not do anything about their geography, nor could they cede the Bosporus to the Soviets without sacrificing their independence. But neither could they protect it by themselves. Thus, left with only the choice of NATO membership, the Turks joined the Western alliance.

There was a high degree of national unity on this subject. Whatever the ideologies involved, the Soviets were viewed as a direct threat to Turkey. Therefore, using NATO and the United States to help guarantee Turkish territorial integrity was ultimately something around which a consensus could form. NATO membership, of course, led to complications, as these things always do.

To counter the American relationship with Turkey (and with Iran, which also blocked Soviet southward movement), the Soviets developed a strategy of alliances — and subversion — of Arab countries. First Egypt, then Syria, Iraq and other countries came under Soviet influence between the 1950s and 1970s. Turkey found itself in a vise between the Soviets and Iraq and Syria. And with Egypt — with its Soviet weapons and advisers — also in the Soviet orbit, Turkey’s southern frontier was seriously threatened.

Turkey had two possible responses to this situation. One was to build up its military and economy to take advantage of its mountainous geography and deter attack. For this, Turkey needed the United States. The second option was to create cooperative relations with other countries in the region that were hostile to both the Soviets and the left-wing Arab regimes. The two countries that fit this bill were Israel and pre-1979 Iran under the shah. Iran tied down Iraq. Israel tied down Syria and Egypt. In effect, these two countries neutralized the threat of Soviet pressure from the south.

Thus was born the Turkish relationship with Israel. Both countries belonged to the American anti-Soviet alliance system and therefore had a general common interest in conditions in the eastern Mediterranean. Both countries also had a common interest in containing Syria. From the standpoint of the Turkish army, and therefore the Turkish government, a close collaboration with Israel made perfect sense.


Islamist Internationalism


There is a second vision of Turkey, however: that of Turkey as a Muslim power with responsibilities beyond guaranteeing its own national security. This viewpoint would of course break the country’s relationship with Israel and the United States. In some sense, this is a minor consideration now. Israel is no longer indispensable for Turkish national security, and Turkey has outgrown outright dependence on the United States. (These days, the United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States.)


Under this second vision, Turkey would extend its power outward in support of Muslims. This vision, if pursued to the full, would involve Turkey in the Balkans in support of Albanians and Bosnians, for example. It would also see Turkey extend its influence southward to help shape Arab regimes. And it would cause Turkey to become deeply involved in Central Asia, where it has natural ties and influence. Ultimately, this vision also would return Turkey to maritime power status, influencing events in North Africa. It is at its heart a very expansionist vision, and one that would require the active support of a military that, at present, is somewhat squeamish about leaving home.

Along with Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran and Egypt, Turkey is one of only five major powers in the Islamic world with enough economic and military potential to affect anything beyond their immediate neighbors. Indonesia and Pakistan are internally fragmented and struggling to hold together; their potential is largely bottled up. Iran is in a long-term confrontation with the United States and must use all of its strength in dealing with that relationship, limiting its options for expansion. Egypt is internally crippled by its regime and economy, and without significant internal evolutions it cannot project power.

Turkey, on the other hand, is now the world’s 17th-largest economy. It boasts a gross domestic product (GDP) that is larger than that of every other Muslim country, including Saudi Arabia; larger than that of every EU country other than Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands; and nearly five times larger than that of Israel. In per capita GDP, Turkey ranks much lower on the global scale, but national power — the total weight a country can bring to bear on the international system — frequently depends more on the total size of the economy than on per capita income. (Consider China, which has a per capita income less than half that of Turkey’s.) Turkey is surrounded by instability in the Arab world, in the Caucasus and in the Balkans. But it is the most stable and dynamic economy in its region and, after Israel, has the most effective armed forces.

On occasion, Turkey goes beyond its borders. It has, for example, moved into Iraq in a combined air-ground operation to attack units of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish separatist group. But it is Turkey’s policy to avoid deep entanglements. From the Turkish Islamist point of view, however, a power of this magnitude under the control of an Islamist regime would be in a position to spread its influence dramatically. As mentioned, this is not what the army or the secularists want: They remember how the Ottoman Empire sapped Turkish strength, and they do not want a repeat.


Erdogan’s Challenge and Turkey’s Future


It is not fair to say that Turkey is a deeply divided society. Instead, Turkey has learned to blend discord. At the moment, Erdogan probably represents the center of the Turkish political spectrum. But he is stuck trying to balance three competing forces. The first is an economy that remains robust and is likely to grow further despite suffering setbacks (along with the rest of the world). The second is a capable military that does not want excessive foreign entanglements, and certainly not for religious reasons. And the third is an Islamist movement that wants to see Turkey as part of the Islamic world — and perhaps even the leader of that world.

Erdogan does not want to weaken the Turkish economy, and he sees radical Islamist ideas as endangering Turkey’s middle class. He wants to placate the army and keep it from acting politically. He also wants to placate the radical Islamists, who could draw the army out of the barracks, or worse, weaken the economy. Erdogan thus wants to keep business, the military and the religious sector happy simultaneously.

This is no easy task, and Erdogan was clearly furious at Israel for attacking Gaza and making that task harder. Turkey was crucial in developing the Israeli-Syrian dialogue. This means the wider world now views Turkey’s leadership as regionally engaged, something its risk-averse military is more than a little touchy about. Erdogan therefore saw Israel as endangering Turkey’s military-civilian power balance and squandering its tentative steps into the regional spotlight for what he considered a pointless operation in Gaza.

Still, Erdogan did not want to break with Israel. So he became furious with the moderator. Whether this was calculated or simply reflected his response to the situation he finds himself in is immaterial. The outburst allowed him to appear to break with Israel decisively without actually creating such a rupture. He thus deftly continued to walk his fine line.

The question is how long Erdogan can maintain the balance. The more chaotic the region around Turkey becomes and the stronger Turkey gets, the more irresistible will be the sheer geopolitical pressure on Turkey to fill the vacuum. Add to that an expansionist ideology — a Turkish Islamism — and a potent new force in the region could quickly emerge. The one thing that can restrain this process is Russia. If Moscow forces Georgia to submit and brings its forces back to the Turkish border in Armenia, the Turks will have to reorient their policy back to one of blocking the Russians. But regardless of what level Russian power returns to over the next few years, the longer-term growth of Turkish power is inevitable — and something that must be considered carefully.