Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Mubarak in Washington,
Changes to expect in the Middle East?
Or in a post-Mubarak Egypt?
The complicate economic context in Egypt - miracle or political hocus-pocus?.
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Israel arrests Hamas political leaders
Mohammed Daraghmeh
March 19
Israel rounded up 10 Hamas leaders in the West Bank early Thursday, two days after indirect talks between Israel and the Islamic militant group on a prisoner swap broke down.
Among those detained were four Hamas lawmakers, a university professor and a former Hamas deputy prime minister.
The Israeli military said in a statement that those arrested were involved in "restoring the Hamas administrative branch." Hamas in the West Bank has been the target of a crackdown by Israel and the security forces of moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in the past two years, ever since the militants seized Gaza by force.
The detentions appear to be an attempt to pressure the group after the failure of recent efforts to win the release of an Israeli soldier, Sgt. Gilad Schalit, who is being held by Hamas in Gaza.
Ahmed Bahar, a Hamas leader in Gaza, denounced the arrests as "immoral blackmail by the Zionist occupation."
Israel has detained dozens of Hamas politicians in the West Bank on various occasions following the capture of Schalit, 22, in a cross-border raid in June 2006.
The detainees in the latest raid include Nasser Shaer, a former Palestinian deputy prime minister, and four Hamas lawmakers. Some have already been detained in the past and released.
Outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had hoped to secure the release of Schalit before a new Israeli government is formed, possibly within days. To that end, he dispatched two senior envoys to Cairo over the weekend to try to clinch an Egyptian-brokered deal with Hamas, which rules Gaza and has no direct ties with Israel.
But the envoys returned to Israel without a deal in hand, and on Tuesday Olmert declared that Israel would not free all of the hundreds of Palestinian prisoners the Islamic militants demanded in exchange.
Some were involved in attacks that killed dozens of Israelis, and Olmert insisted that there were "red lines" that Israel "will not cross."
Incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is expected to partner with hawkish parties in Israel's new government, has not commented on the failed release efforts or how he plans to deal with Schalit's case.
The failure of the prisoner swap talks threatens to set off a long chain reaction of setbacks. Israel has vowed not to lift its crushing blockade of impoverished Gaza until Schalit is returned home. That could seriously impede reconstruction there after Israel's recent military offensive because building materials and equipment won't be able to enter the territory, home to 1.4 million Palestinians.
The continued blockade could also hamper efforts to cement a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas, which in turn would carry the threat of a sudden escalation in the low-level violence that has continued since the war ended on Jan. 18.
On Wednesday, Schalit's father, Noam, blamed Olmert for failing to free his son and said the family would dismantle a protest tent it set up outside Olmert's residence on Saturday — 1,000 days since the serviceman was captured.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Israel considering prisoner exchange for soldier
Steve Weizman
AP
Israel's Security Cabinet opened debate Wednesday on a possible prisoner exchange with Hamas that could trade hundreds of Palestinian prisoners for a soldier captured in June 2007.
But a minister participating in the talks said it was unlikely there would be a firm decision on the exact terms of a deal or which prisoners could be released. Social Welfare chief Isaac Hertzog told Army Radio he believed hopes had been raised "a little too high" ahead of the meeting.
"As I understand it, it is a process," he said, adding that the same applied to talks on prospects for a long-term truce in Gaza, which are also on the agenda. "We shall examine what is the current status of the truce and the intensive efforts to free Gilad Shalit, where things stand and what are the parameters."
On Tuesday, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert repeated his new condition that Sgt. Gilad Shalit must be freed.
"We will negotiate his release first and only then will we be willing to discuss things like the Gaza crossings and rebuilding" the Gaza Strip, Olmert said during a tour of Jerusalem.
Israel and Egypt clamped a blockade on Gaza after Hamas overran the crowded sliver of territory in 2007, allowing in only humanitarian supplies.
In Damascus, exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal complained about Olmert's new condition.
"There can be no truce unless the blockade is lifted and the crossings are opened. The truce issue should not be linked to the issue of prisoner Schalit," Mashaal told reporters in Damascus after meeting with Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa.
Olmert indicated that negotiations might take weeks. His term will end soon, when a new prime minister takes over. "Even if Shalit's case cannot be resolved while I am in office, the foundations we built will facilitate in his release," he said.
Last week's Israeli election ended inconclusively. Israel's president will start consultations with political parties Wednesday, beginning a period of up to seven weeks toward formation of a new government.
At stake in the truce talks is stabilizing the area after Israel's punishing offensive in Gaza last month, aimed at Hamas militants who took part in or allowed daily rocket fire at Israel. The offensive left about 1,300 Palestinians dead, at least half of them civilians, according to Gaza health officials. Thirteen Israelis were killed.
Since the fighting ended Jan. 18 when Hamas and Israel independently declared a truce, there has been sporadic rocket fire from Gaza, triggering Israeli airstrikes aimed at smuggling tunnels and Hamas outposts.
Early on Wednesday, Israeli aircraft struck smuggling tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border and a disused Hamas security base near the town of Khan Younis, local Palestinian security officials said.
They said the Hamas base had already been largely reduced to rubble in previous air attacks since the Jan. 18 end of Israel's land campaign in the strip, but this time a mosque left standing inside the compound was destroyed. There were no reports of casualties.
The Israeli military said aircraft hit seven tunnels and the Khan Younis base in response to the Palestinians firing 45 rockets and mortar shells since the Jan. 18 cease-fire.
Later in the morning a rocket fired from Gaza fell in open ground in southern Israel, police said. There were no reported casualties.
On Tuesday, the United Nations said five tons of unexploded Israeli bombs kept under Hamas guard in Gaza have been stolen. "It's clearly extremely dangerous and needs to be disposed of in a safe manner," U.N. spokesman Richard Miron said. The Israeli military blamed Hamas for the theft. Hamas officials in Gaza contacted by the AP said they had no knowledge of the matter.
Egypt has been mediating the truce talks, because Hamas and Israel refuse to deal with each other directly.
Hamas does not recognize Israel. Many of its leaders stick to the group's ideology calling for destruction of the Jewish state, but some say they would accept a Palestinian state next to Israel.
Israel, the U.S. and the European Union list Hamas as a terror organization because it has sent dozens of suicide bombers into Israel, killing hundreds.
The main issues in the truce talks will be discussed at the Wednesday's meeting, Regev said.
Hamas wants hundreds of Palestinian prisoners released in exchange for Schalit, the soldier captured in a cross-border raid. Some prisoners were convicted of participating in or planning some of the bloodiest Palestinian attacks against Israel.
Israel has had a policy of not freeing prisoners directly involved in deadly attacks, but the principle has been eroded in recent years.
Sunday, February 15, 2009
Post-electoral troubled waters in Israel
Saturday, December 20, 2008
ANALYSIS / Has the Gaza ceasefire really breathed its last?
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
Ha'aretz
The way things looked yesterday afternoon, the cease-fire hadn't breathed its last. According to Hamas, the official expiration date falls today, December 19. But in fact, resuscitation efforts - by the Israelis, mostly - continue. Paradoxically, it's defense officials regularly accused of warmongering who are trying to prevent renewed fighting.
True, rockets have been hitting communities around Gaza in recent weeks, but senior security officials still feel the time is not yet ripe for a broad ground operation. This is the view not only of Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, head of the Defense Ministry's political bureau, but also of Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, who isn't pressing for action either.
There are myriad arguments against a war in Gaza, but the strongest is the one defense officials can't utter aloud because it has to do with the politicians above them. It would be hard to go into Gaza at the height of an election campaign. When one considers how political battles are already affecting decision making and public statements, it's not difficult to imagine what it would be like to try to run a war in the period leading up to the vote.
So for the time being we can expect turbulent times along the Gaza border, but in the slightly longer run, Israel (and more importantly, perhaps, Hamas) does not have an interest in an all-out confrontation. Even when the pronouncements sound more insistent than ever, it's worth recalling how many times in recent years Israel has found itself in a similar situation - and ultimately decided not to take action. It's quite possible that a major operation will eventually take place, but the decision to go ahead will only be made when there's a genuine sense that there is no other choice.
The Israel Defense Forces recently updated its operational plans for various potential escalation scenarios. It has also formulated different levels of response that fall short of an all-out war. But the chief of staff knows that there's no such thing as a half-war, and that even a limited entry into part of the territory (the logical targets would be the rocket-launching areas in northern Gaza and the smuggling zone in the south) could evolve into something bigger.
And while the military plan is relatively clear, there is still a gaping hole in the political sphere: Just what will Israel do after the IDF occupies the Gaza Strip? The ministers currently pushing for action are liable to find themselves in the position of former U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had to admit that the Bush administration did not adequately prepare itself for what would happen after the occupation of Iraq. "Stuff happens," Rumsfeld explained with a shrug when confronted with images of the widespread mayhem in Baghdad.
Amos Gilad has made it clear in media interviews that we saw what happened when we went into Lebanon in 1982 to expel Fatah and ended up creating Hezbollah. We need to take into account that an occupation of the Gaza Strip would require us to feed 1.5 million people, endanger relations with Egypt and Jordan and potentially ignite a firestorm in the Muslim world.
It's hard to say that Israel made the most of the months of the cease-fire. The government approved the budget for upgrading the protection of communities near Gaza only two weeks ago, after six months of pleading from Barak and Ashkenazi. Introduction of the Iron Dome system for rocket interception is not likely to meet the ambitious timetable set by the defense establishment.
A rocket expert familiar with the program says that "Rafael [Advanced Defense Systems] is doing excellent work, but there are still some problems in integrating all the parts. One reason is that Barak did not a appoint someone as a 'czar' holding all the authority, as was done in the past with projects like the Arrow missile." The saga of the flawed handling of the Qassam interception program will soon receive a scathing assessment in a report by the state comptroller.
Early electioneering
The Israeli reporters invited to the office of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Tuesday evening asked him a raft of questions about the upcoming Israeli election. Abbas, with Israeli MK Ahmed Tibi (Ta'al) in attendance, was evasive. "It's an internal Israeli matter. We'll work with any government that is elected in Israel," he said.
When asked about continuing his tenure, he explained almost casually that there will be elections for the Palestinian presidency and parliament next year. Even though Hamas opposes early parliamentary elections, which are currently scheduled for January 2010, Abbas said that if the attempts to renew the dialogue between Fatah and Hamas are not fruitful, he will unilaterally declare early elections. "And what will happen if Hamas refuses to go along? How will you hold elections in Gaza?" he was asked. He didn't have an answer.
Although the likelihood of elections in the territories soon is low, the two organizations were going at it this week as if they were in the throes of a heated campaign. Last Saturday, Hamas held a rally in Gaza marking the 21st anniversary of its founding, and the crowd numbered around 200,000. It was a tremendous show of power, not only because of the event's magnitude (about every seventh Gazan took part), but also because of the exemplary order. A Gazan journalist says the money Hamas spent on the rally could have easily helped several thousand people survive the difficult siege conditions for another month.
Meanwhile, on Monday at the Muqata in Ramallah, there was a reception for the 227 prisoners Israel released as a gesture to Abbas. The crowd here was only in the hundreds, but they waved Fatah and Palestinian flags and cheered loud and long for Abbas when he began to speak. Ironically, while Abbas and Fatah are succeeding where Hamas has so far failed - prisoner releases and improving the economy - Fatah had trouble recruiting a big crowd for its event.
But Hamas has other problems to contend with. The consensus that once prevailed in the organization is cracking. At the beginning of the week, the rifts were hard to obscure, as Khaled Meshal, head of the political bureau in Damascus, announced that the truce was ending, while Hamas spokesmen in Gaza were saying that everything was still open. Within 24 hours, everybody in Damascus and Gaza was touting the new official line: The cease-fire is over, but Hamas will respond only if attacked by Israel.
Like the frog in the pot
The repulsive spectacle about Gilad Shalit staged by Hamas at its Gaza rally once again reflects the deep cultural chasm between the two sides. While the organization follows the Israeli media and many of its leaders are alumni of Israeli prisons, they still don't get us and we don't get them. The show in Gaza was a modern incarnation of an old Islamic practice of publicly scorning an enemy before going out to battle. It's also Hezbollah-type thinking, aimed at the soft underbelly - public consciousness. However, if the hope in Gaza was that such a spectacle would hurt Israeli morale, it mainly evoked disgust at Hamas' disdain for human life. At the same time, it's very possible that the numerous ways Israeli is putting pressure on the people in Gaza is only boosting support for Hamas.
The Shalit affair has become a pretext for political mudslinging, which isn't doing a thing to help secure his release. The organizations calling for his release have become a national movement, headed by a retired brigadier general and with the soldier's picture printed on T-shirts. It's hard to know if any of this is bringing results or only reinforcing Hamas' assessment that it can break Israel's fortitude.
The handling of the Shalit affair will certainly be pored over in the future. The foul-ups, particularly at the start, could well deserve the state comptroller's scrutiny. There were plenty of steps that Israel could have taken early on: declaring the Palestinian prisoners and Shalit prisoners of war, forbidding Red Cross visits to the prisoners, or abducting Hamas members from Gaza to serve as bargaining chips. Each of these ideas has its potential benefits and risks. But any move like this would also have necessitated negotiations that would last even more months, during which the risk of Shalit being harmed or disappearing would increase.
It's unlikely that Shalit will return home during the tenure of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, under whom the abduction occurred. Ofer Dekel, the coordinator of the negotiations who has already considered resigning several times, will probably step down around the time Olmert leaves office. The exhausting negotiations before the prisoner swap with Hezbollah placed him in a harsh confrontation with the heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet security service.
The argument between Dekel and Shin Bet chief Diskin has not abated and is particularly charged. It is still going on for two basic reasons: The IDF messed up when it did not thwart the abduction and the Shin Bet messed up when it couldn't locate Shalit.
Throughout the time that has passed since, various operational plans for rescuing Shalit from Gaza have been considered. But they never went ahead because the intelligence wasn't precise enough and the army couldn't come up with a plan with a good chance of rescuing Shalit while getting the rescue force out of Gaza with minimal casualties. The IDF is presuming that Hamas has learned the lessons of the failed Nachshon Wachsman rescue operation, which ended with the soldier being killed by his captors when the Sayeret Matkal burst in to where he was being held. Arab media reports that Shalit is being held somewhere booby-trapped with explosives are being taken as credible.
There are plenty of logical explanations on why Shalit has still not been rescued, more than 900 days since he was abducted, just as there are plenty of excellent reasons not to re-occupy the Gaza Strip. But Israel's dilemma is reminiscent of the fable about the frog that's put into a pot of hot water where the temperature rises one degree at a time. The creature becomes accustomed to the steadily worsening situation without fully appreciating its implications.